| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix use-after-free freeing trigger private data
Commit 61d445af0a7c ("tracing: Add bulk garbage collection of freeing
event_trigger_data") moved the kfree() of event_trigger_data to a kthread
that runs tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() before freeing. That removed
the synchronization the trigger .free callbacks used to get implicitly and
inline from trigger_data_free().
event_hist_trigger_free(), event_hist_trigger_named_free() and
event_enable_trigger_free() free their satellite data (hist_data, cmd_ops,
enable_data) right after trigger_data_free() returns. With the
synchronization now deferred to the kthread, a concurrent tracepoint
handler can still reach that data through the list_del_rcu()'d trigger,
causing a use-after-free.
The histogram teardown must stay synchronous: remove_hist_vars() and
unregister_field_var_hists() have to detach a synthetic event from the
histogram before the trigger-removal write returns, otherwise a following
command races in and the synthetic-event removal fails with -EBUSY, as the
trigger-synthetic-eprobe.tc selftest catches. Make those callbacks wait
with the correct barrier - tracepoint_synchronize_unregister(), matching
the free kthread - before freeing.
The enable trigger has no such synchronous requirement, and a blocking
synchronize there would re-serialize the path that commit deliberately
deferred. Give it an optional private_data_free() callback that the free
kthread runs after its grace period, and free enable_data from there. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs
An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose
reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer,
however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful
dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive,
so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a
later access to that resv is a use-after-free:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c
Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]
RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0
This can be reached on two paths:
- dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or
- ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.
In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter
resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which
locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has
been freed.
Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before
ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and
release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole
BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.
v2:
- Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before
dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.
- Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore
incomplete imports.
v3:
- Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be
valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.
- Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on
import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.
- Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.
v4:
- Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences
are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).
- Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).
v5:
- Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach
succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is
already LRU-visible. (Thomas)
v4 patch:
https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2
- Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4.
v6:
- Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv
individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5),
just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the
shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it.
Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)
- Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved()
so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).
- Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach
also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost
BO that outlived the exporter.
Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/
v7:
- Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.
- Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)
(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: drain a slave's callback before its master detaches it
snd_timer_close_locked() drains the closing instance's own in-flight
callback (IFLG_CALLBACK) before freeing it, but not its slaves'. When a
master instance is closed, remove_slave_links() clears each slave's
->timer; the slave's own close then reads timer == NULL and takes the
branch that skips the drain entirely (snd_timer_stop_slave() also no-ops
on a NULL timer). So a slave whose callback is still running when the
master is closed is freed underneath the live callback, leading to
use-after-free.
Drain the slaves too before remove_slave_links() severs them.
snd_timer_stop() has already taken this instance off the active list, so
no new slave callback can be queued. Take the slaves off the ack list so
a pending one can't fire either, then wait for any that is already in
flight. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: fix use-after-free in aggr_reset_state()
The aggr_reset_state() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous)
for the aggregation timer before proceeding to delete TID state and
before the structure is freed by callers like aggr_module_destroy().
If the timer callback (aggr_timeout) is executing when aggr_reset_state()
is called, the callback will continue to access aggr_conn fields like
rx_tid[] and stat[] which may be freed immediately after by
kfree(aggr_info->aggr_conn) in aggr_module_destroy().
Additionally, the timer callback can re-arm itself via mod_timer() while
aggr_reset_state() is running, creating a more complex race condition.
Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback
has completed before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Delay module ref count for "enable_event" trigger
Triggers are now delayed from freeing, but can still be triggered until
after the RCU grace period has ended. The freeing of the enable_event data
is put into the private_data_free() callback, but the put of the module
refcount is done immediately.
It is possible that if a module is removed that has an event that would
enable (or disable) it is still active, it can read the data of the module
after it is removed causing a use-after-free bug.
Move the trace_event_put_ref() that releases the module into the delayed
callback so that the module can not be removed until any reference to its
events are finished. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses
huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle
of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are
pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma).
The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer
whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio,
and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over
the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of
CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES !=
CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit
state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate
beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access
physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map
address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole,
dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel
panic.
Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before
checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer
whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix stale skb->sk reference on subflow close
The backlog list is updated by mptcp_data_ready() under
mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup of backlog references to a closing
subflow, however, was performed in mptcp_close_ssk(), before
__mptcp_close_ssk() acquires the ssk lock, and while holding neither
the ssk lock nor mptcp_data_lock().
Because that traversal ran without mptcp_data_lock(), concurrent softirq
RX processing on another CPU (subflow_data_ready() -> mptcp_data_ready()
-> __mptcp_add_backlog(), under mptcp_data_lock()) could add a backlog
entry referencing the ssk while the cleanup loop was in progress. Such
an entry could be missed by the cleanup, or the concurrent list update
could corrupt the traversal, leaving skb->sk pointing at the ssk after
it is freed.
A later mptcp_backlog_purge() then dereferences the stale pointer,
triggering a warning in inet_sock_destruct() (ssk->sk_rmem_alloc != 0)
followed by a use-after-free in mptcp_backlog_purge().
Fix this by moving the backlog cleanup into __mptcp_close_ssk(), after
subflow->closing is set to 1 and while the ssk lock is still held,
serialized under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup runs only on the push
path (MPTCP_CF_PUSH), where backlog references accumulate; on other
teardown paths the caller already handles cleanup.
With subflow->closing set and mptcp_data_lock() held across the purge,
any concurrent mptcp_data_ready() either completes its enqueue before
the purge runs and is caught, or observes closing=1 and bails out. Once
mptcp_data_unlock() is reached, no new skb referencing the ssk can be
enqueued, so the cleanup is exhaustive.
Remove the unprotected traversal from mptcp_close_ssk() entirely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid auth_enable sysctl UAF during netns teardown
proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing
net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from
ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network
namespace while that namespace is being torn down.
SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(),
while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This
exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable
before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable
stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control
socket.
Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after
sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before
destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl
registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the
control socket in the same init path.
Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the
saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister
helper. |
| The native inference process that Elasticsearch uses to evaluate uploaded machine learning models accepts a model operation that computes a memory address from an offset supplied inside the model, without validating that the offset stays within the bounds of the underlying storage. A user with the privileges required to upload and deploy a trained model can craft a model that reads and writes memory outside the intended allocation. The result is heap corruption that crashes the inference process, and, with sufficient control over the heap layout, could allow arbitrary code execution in the context of that process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx-lpi2c: mark I2C adapter when hardware is powered down
On some i.MX platforms, certain I2C client drivers keep a periodic
workqueue which continues to trigger I2C transfers.
During system suspend/resume, there exists a time window between:
- suspend_noirq and the system entering suspend
- the system starting to resume and resume_noirq
In this window, the I2C controller resources such as clock and pinctrl
may already be disabled or not yet restored.
If a workqueue triggers an I2C transfer in this period, the driver
attempts to access I2C registers while the hardware resources are
unavailable, which may lead to system hang.
Mark the I2C adapter as suspended during noirq suspend and block new
transfers until resume, ensuring that I2C transfers are only issued
when hardware resources are available. |
| Untrusted pointer dereference in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: qup: fix error pointer deref after DMA setup failure
The driver falls back to PIO mode if DMA setup fails during probe.
Make sure to the clear the DMA channel pointers on setup failure to
avoid dereferencing an error pointer (or attempting to release a channel
a second time) on later probe errors or driver unbind.
This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing a devres allocation
conversion patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: ep93xx: fix error pointer deref after DMA setup failure
The driver falls back to PIO mode if DMA setup fails during probe.
Make sure to the clear the DMA channel pointers on setup failure to
avoid dereferencing an error pointer on later probe errors or driver
unbind.
This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing a devres allocation
conversion patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover() accesses sq->netdev after
mlx5e_safe_reopen_channels() has torn down and freed the channel (and
its embedded SQs). Replace the three sq->netdev references with
priv->netdev which is safe because priv outlives channel teardown.
The netdev_err() call already used priv->netdev for this reason; make
the trylock/unlock and health_channel_eq_recover calls consistent.
This fixes the following KASAN splat:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff889860ed0b28 by task kworker/u113:2/5277
Call Trace:
mlx5e_tx_reporter_timeout_recover+0x1dd/0x360 [mlx5_core]
devlink_health_reporter_recover+0xa2/0x150
devlink_health_report+0x254/0x7c0
mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0x297/0x380 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x109/0x170 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x677/0xf20
worker_thread+0x51f/0xd90
kthread+0x3a5/0x810
ret_from_fork+0x208/0x400
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hsr: defer node table free until after RCU readers
HSR node-list and node-status generic-netlink operations run under
rcu_read_lock(). They walk hsr->node_db through hsr_get_next_node() and
hsr_get_node_data(), but RTM_DELLINK teardown removes the same node table
with plain list_del() and frees each node immediately.
That lets a generic-netlink reader hold a struct hsr_node pointer across
hsr_dellink(). In a KASAN build, widening the reader window after
hsr_get_next_node() obtains the node reproduces a slab-use-after-free
when the reader copies node->macaddress_A; the freeing stack is
hsr_del_nodes() from hsr_dellink().
Use list_del_rcu() and defer the free through the existing
hsr_free_node_rcu() callback. This matches the lifetime rule used by the
HSR prune paths, which already delete nodes with list_del_rcu() and
call_rcu(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: refresh hdr pointer before ioam6_event()
Reported by Sashiko:
In ipv6_hop_ioam(), the hdr pointer is initialized to point into the
skb's linear data buffer. Later, the code calls skb_ensure_writable(),
which might reallocate the buffer:
if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, optoff + 2 + hdr->opt_len))
goto drop;
/* Trace pointer may have changed */
trace = (struct ioam6_trace_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb)
+ optoff + sizeof(*hdr));
ioam6_fill_trace_data(skb, ns, trace, true);
ioam6_event(IOAM6_EVENT_TRACE, dev_net(skb->dev),
GFP_ATOMIC, (void *)trace, hdr->opt_len - 2);
If the skb is cloned or lacks sufficient linear headroom,
skb_ensure_writable() will invoke pskb_expand_head(), which reallocates
the skb's data buffer and frees the old one, invalidating pointers to
it. While the code recalculates the trace pointer immediately after the
call to skb_ensure_writable(), it fails to recalculate the hdr pointer.
This patch fixes the above by recalculating the hdr pointer before
passing hdr->opt_len to ioam6_event(), so that we avoid any UaF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix register tracking for F_PRESENT flag
nft_exthdr_init() passes user-controlled priv->len to
nft_parse_register_store(), which marks that many bytes in the
register bitmap as initialized. However, when NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT
is set, the eval paths write only 1 byte (nft_reg_store8) or
4 bytes (*dest = 0 on TCP/DCCP error path). When len > 4,
registers beyond the first are never written, retaining
uninitialized stack data from nft_regs.
Bail out if userspace requests too much data when F_PRESENT is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (gigabyte_waterforce) Stop device IO before calling hid_hw_stop
Calling hid_hw_stop() does not stop the device IO.
This results in a race condition between hid_input_report() and the point
immediately following the execution of hid_device_io_start() within
the driver probe function. If the probe operation fails after "io start"
has been initiated, this race condition will result in a UAF vulnerability.
Fix the problem by calling hid_device_io_stop() before calling
hid_hw_stop(). |
| A flaw was found in acm-search-v2-rhel9. An attacker with administrative privileges on the hub cluster, specifically with patch access to the Search Custom Resource (CR), could exploit a vulnerability in the `Collector.ImageOverride` field. This allows the attacker to deploy an arbitrary container image across all managed clusters. The consequence is remote code execution (RCE), enabling the attacker to execute commands and potentially access sensitive information across the entire fleet of managed clusters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: synproxy: add mutex to guard hook reference counting
As the synproxy infrastructure register netfilter hooks on-demand when a
user adds the first iptables target or nftables expression, if done
concurrently they can race each other.
Introduce a mutex to serialize the refcount control blocks access from
both frontends. While a per namespace mutex might be more efficient, it
is not needed for target/expression like SYNPROXY. |
