| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Inject SEA if guest VNCR isn't normal memory
When constructing an L1 VNCR mapping, KVM unconditionally uses cacheable
memory attributes, even if the underlying PFN isn't memory. This gets
particularly hairy if the endpoint doesn't support cacheable memory
attributes, potentially throwing an SError on writeback...
While KVM does permit cacheable memory attributes on certain PFNMAP
VMAs, kvm_translate_vncr() isn't currently grabbing the VMA. So do the
simpler thing for now and just reject everything that isn't memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: fix off-by-one in BD ring consumption on build_skb failure
qede_rx_build_skb() and qede_tpa_rx_build_skb() do not check for a
NULL return from qede_build_skb(). When it returns NULL under memory
pressure, the functions still consume a BD from the ring before
returning NULL. The callers then recycle additional BDs, resulting in
one extra BD being consumed (off-by-one). This desynchronizes the BD
ring, which can corrupt DMA page reference counts and lead to SLUB
freelist corruption.
Commit 4e910dbe3650 ("qede: confirm skb is allocated before using")
added a NULL check inside qede_build_skb() to prevent a NULL pointer
dereference, but did not address the missing NULL checks in the
callers, making this off-by-one reachable.
Fix this by adding NULL checks for the return value of
qede_build_skb() in both qede_rx_build_skb() and
qede_tpa_rx_build_skb(), returning NULL immediately before any BD ring
manipulation. |
| Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Prior to 4.5.6, GlancesActions.run() in glances/actions.py ignores --disable-config-exec for on-alert action commands and invokes secure_popen() with shell operators enabled, allowing configured redirection, command chaining, or pipes to execute when an alert triggers. This issue is fixed in 4.5.6. |
| OpenChoreo is a complete, open-source developer platform for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2, OpenChoreo Workflow Plane templates under samples/getting-started/workflow-templates/ interpolated developer-controlled workflow parameters into shell program text executed through sh -c instead of passing the values through container.env, allowing arbitrary commands to run in workflow pods while affected privileged Podman templates lacked hostUsers: false. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.4, 1.1.4, and 1.2.0-rc.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Guard conntrack opts error writes
The conntrack lookup and allocation kfuncs take an opts pointer
together with an opts__sz argument. The verifier checks only the memory
range described by opts__sz, but the wrappers unconditionally write
opts->error whenever the internal lookup or allocation helper returns an
error.
For an invalid size smaller than the end of opts->error, that write can
land outside the verifier-checked range. Keep returning NULL for invalid
arguments, but only report the error through opts->error when the
supplied size includes the field.
This preserves error reporting for the supported 12-byte and 16-byte
layouts, and for other invalid sizes that still include opts->error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/pvcalls: bound backend response req_id before indexing rsp[]
pvcalls_front_event_handler() takes req_id directly from the
backend-supplied ring response and uses it to index the fixed-size
bedata->rsp[] array for a memcpy() and a store, with no range check. A
malicious or buggy backend can set req_id past PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING
and drive an out-of-bounds write past the bedata allocation.
req_id was also declared int while the wire field rsp->req_id is u32, so
a range check on the signed value alone is insufficient: a backend
req_id of 0xffffffff becomes -1, passes a >= PVCALLS_NR_RSP_PER_RING
test and indexes bedata->rsp[-1]. Declare req_id as u32 so a single
bound covers both ends.
A backend that sends an out-of-range req_id has violated the wire
protocol, so rather than silently dropping the response, log once and
stop trusting the backend: set bedata->disabled. The event handler then
ignores further responses, and the request paths that wait for a
response return -EIO instead of blocking forever. This mirrors the
fatal-error handling xen-netback uses (xenvif_fatal_tx_err()).
The pvcalls frontend currently trusts its backend, so this is not a
classic-Xen security issue, but it matters for hardening PV frontends
against malicious backends (confidential and disaggregated deployments). |
| In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2026.2.1 rCE via Markdown export tool was possible |
| IBM Security Verify Access 10.0 through 10.0.9.2 and IBM Verify Identity Access 11.0 through 11.0.3 and IBM Verify Identity Access Container 11.0 through 11.0.3 contains a input validation vulnerability in the management interface that allows already privileged attackers to execute additional operations by crafting a malicious HTTP request. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands due to improper neutralization of shell metacharacters. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands due to improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: thunderbolt: Fix frags[] overflow by bounding frame_count
tbnet_poll() assembles a multi-frame ThunderboltIP packet into one skb. The
first frame goes into the skb linear area and every further frame is added as
a page fragment.
skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
page, hdr_size, frame_size,
TBNET_RX_PAGE_SIZE - hdr_size);
A packet of frame_count frames therefore ends up with frame_count - 1
fragments. tbnet_check_frame() only bounds the peer supplied frame_count to
TBNET_RING_SIZE / 4 (64), which is far above MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17 by default). A
peer that sends a packet of 19 or more small frames pushes nr_frags past
MAX_SKB_FRAGS, so skb_add_rx_frag() writes past skb_shinfo()->frags[] and
corrupts memory after the shared info.
Tighten the start of packet bound to MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1 so a packet can never
produce more fragments than frags[] can hold. This matches the recent skb
frags overflow fixes in other receive paths, for example f0813bcd2d9d ("net:
wwan: t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path") and 600dc40554dc
("net: usb: cdc-phonet: fix skb frags[] overflow in rx_complete()"). |
| The Zephyr ADIN2111/ADIN1110 10BASE-T1S/T1L Ethernet driver (drivers/ethernet/eth_adin2111.c) reassembles received Ethernet frames in OPEN Alliance (OA) SPI mode by copying device-supplied 64-byte data chunks into a fixed static buffer ctx->buf of size CONFIG_ETH_ADIN2111_BUFFER_SIZE (default 1524 bytes). In eth_adin2111_oa_data_read(), each valid chunk was memcpy'd into ctx->buf[ctx->scur] and the write cursor scur advanced, with no check that scur + len stayed within the buffer. The number of chunks (up to 255, from the BUFSTS RCA field) and the per-chunk length are taken entirely from the frame data received off the wire; the cursor is only reset on a start-of-frame chunk. An attacker on the single-pair Ethernet segment can therefore send a frame whose reassembled size exceeds the configured buffer, causing the driver's RX offload thread to write attacker-controlled frame bytes past the end of the static buffer into adjacent driver/kernel memory (up to roughly 14.8 KB in the worst case). This is a remotely/adjacently reachable out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) that can corrupt memory and cause denial of service or potentially code execution. The defect was introduced when OA SPI support was added (commit 0ca8b0756b1) and shipped in releases v3.7.0 through v4.4.0. The fix adds a bounds check that drops the oversized frame and resets the cursor before the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer
indx_insert_into_buffer() computes
used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size;
memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1->de_off));
where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split(). hdr_find_split()
walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e->size) without validating that each
step stays within hdr->used or that the size field is at least
sizeof(struct NTFS_DE). index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper,
only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does
not walk per-entry sizes.
A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but
contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes
validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the
ntfs_create() -> indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split()
return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining
bytes in the buffer. The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove
count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel
write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel.
Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a
single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to
fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove. Trigger requires only local mount
of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable
media auto-mount).
Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size
already extends past hdr1->used. This is the minimal fix; it
preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the
same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns.
A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove
was fixed in commit b8c44949044e ("fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in
indx_insert_into_buffer") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix
does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is
returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is
driven by sp->size rather than hdr->used exceeding hdr->total. |
| D-Link DWR-M961 devices with hardware version C1 and firmware version before 1.1.5_C1_202607071108 contain a command injection vulnerability in the /boafrm/formTracerouteDiagnosticRun interface. A remote attacker can inject arbitrary malicious commands into the host and ipVer fields, resulting in command execution with root privileges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Bound-check xdr_buf_to_bvec() stores before writing
xdr_buf_to_bvec() writes a bio_vec into the caller's array before
testing whether that slot is in range, and the head branch performs
the store with no check at all. When the caller's budget is exactly
used up, the next store lands one element past the end of the array.
The overflow label returns count - 1, which masks the surplus store
but cannot undo it.
rq_bvec, the array passed by nfsd_vfs_write(), is allocated to
exactly rq_maxpages entries with no slack. The OOB store can land in
adjacent slab memory; the bv_len and bv_offset fields written there
are derived from client-supplied RPC payload sizes.
Move the in-range check ahead of the store in the head, page-loop,
and tail branches. With the check at the top of each sequence, count
is incremented only after a successful store, so the overflow label
can return count directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_pedit: fix TOCTOU heap OOB write in tc offload
There is a TOCTOU race condition in flower lockless approach between sizing
a flow_rule buffer and filling it.
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com reports:
The cls_flower classifier operates with TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED
(fl_change runs without RTNL), while RTM_NEWACTION holds RTNL, so the
independent locking domains make the race reachable in practice. KASAN
confirms:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tcf_pedit_offload_act_setup+0x81b/0x930
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888001f27520 by task poc-toctou/312
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 288-byte region [ffff888001f27400, ffff888001f27520)
(cache kmalloc-512)
Note: The result is a heap OOB write attacker-controlled content into the
adjacent slab object (requires CAP_NET_ADMIN).
The fix introduces reading tcfp_nkeys under act->tcfa_lock in all places
using a new tcf_pedit_nkeys_locked() which replaces the old tcf_pedit_nkeys().
Additionally we close the remaining TOCTOU window between the sizing read and
the fill reads by more careful accounting.
Rather than silently truncating the key count, which leads to incorrect
action semantics offloaded to hardware and secondary OOB writes if
the remaining capacity is zero or consumed by prior actions, we enforce
remaining capacity checks and return -ENOSPC if the required space exceeds
the remaining capacity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc3-control: Fix heap overflow in bytes_ext put/get
The ipc_control_data buffer is allocated as kzalloc(max_size), where
max_size covers the entire struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data including its
flexible array payload. However, the bounds checks in bytes_ext_put
and _bytes_ext_get compared user data lengths against max_size
directly, ignoring that cdata->data sits at an offset of
sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes into the allocation.
This allowed writing up to sizeof(struct sof_ipc_ctrl_data) bytes past
the end of the heap buffer from unprivileged userspace via the ALSA TLV
kcontrol interface, and similarly allowed over-reading adjacent heap
data on the get path.
Fix all bounds checks to subtract sizeof(*cdata) from max_size so they
reflect the actual space available at the cdata->data offset. Also fix
the error-path restore in bytes_ext_put which wrote to cdata->data
instead of cdata, causing the same overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: Fix hid_bpf_get_data() range check
hid_bpf_get_data() returns a pointer into the HID-BPF context data when
the caller-provided offset and size fit inside ctx->allocated_size.
The current check adds rdwr_buf_size and offset before comparing the
result against ctx->allocated_size. Since both values are unsigned, a
very large size can wrap the sum below ctx->allocated_size and make the
helper return a pointer even though the requested range is not contained
in the backing buffer.
Use check_add_overflow() to reject wrapped range ends before comparing
the requested range end against ctx->allocated_size. |
| IBM i 7.6, 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to a stack-based buffer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qrtr: fix 32-bit integer overflow in qrtr_endpoint_post()
qrtr_endpoint_post() validates an incoming packet with
if (!size || len != ALIGN(size, 4) + hdrlen)
goto err;
where size comes from the wire. On 32-bit, size_t is 32 bits and
ALIGN(size, 4) wraps to 0 for size >= 0xfffffffd, so the check
passes and skb_put_data(skb, data + hdrlen, size) writes past the
hdrlen-sized skb and oopses the kernel. 64-bit is unaffected.
This is the 32-bit residual of ad9d24c9429e2 ("net: qrtr: fix OOB
Read in qrtr_endpoint_post"), which fixed only the 64-bit case.
Reject any size that cannot fit the buffer before the ALIGN. |
