| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Handle partially initialized auxiliary devices
bnxt_aux_devices_init() calls auxiliary_device_init() before all fields
used by bnxt_aux_dev_release() are initialized. After
auxiliary_device_init() succeeds, later errors must unwind with
auxiliary_device_uninit(), which invokes the release callback.
The release callback assumes that aux_priv->id, aux_priv->edev,
edev->net and edev->ulp_tbl are all populated. If allocation fails
after auxiliary_device_init(), the release path can otherwise dereference
or clear partially initialized state.
Allocate and attach the bnxt_en_dev and ULP table before calling
auxiliary_device_init(), so the release callback only sees a fully
initialized auxiliary private object. If auxiliary_device_init() itself
fails, free those allocations directly because device_initialize() has not
run and the release callback will not be invoked.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual
source review. |
| Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.
Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.
The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.
The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit
handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net
pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit()
reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in
FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a
consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put()
(svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases
sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing
sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code
either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory.
The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt
protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are
independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer
owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected.
Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was
pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file.
Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels
between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching
FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in
handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side
takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference
inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side
operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel()
can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference,
either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by
dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit
get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore
redundant and goes away.
Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the
FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count
assertions stay balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit
The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are
reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto
hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent
drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that
had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace
is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on
the handshake_req allocation.
Pass the source and destination in the documented order
(list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending
list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through
handshake_complete().
Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After
the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers,
threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests.
A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's
TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not
taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls
remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list).
__remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the
scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same
call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an
entry hits LIST_POISON instead.
Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under
hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The
drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing
test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates
between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use
list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list
does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry.
The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false,
but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on
HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference.
Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees
the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list.
Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list,
and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: tear down new links on vif update error path
When ieee80211_vif_update_links() adds new links it allocates a link
container for each and calls ieee80211_link_init() (which registers the
per-link debugfs files with file->private_data pointing into the container)
and ieee80211_link_setup(). If the subsequent drv_change_vif_links() fails,
the error path restores the old pointers and jumps to 'free', which frees
the new containers but never removes their debugfs entries or stops the
links. The debugfs files survive with file->private_data dangling at the
freed container, so a later open()+read() (e.g. link-1/txpower)
dereferences freed memory in ieee80211_if_read_link(), a use-after-free.
The removal path already dismantles links correctly via
ieee80211_tear_down_links(), which removes each link's keys and debugfs
entries and calls ieee80211_link_stop(); the add path on the error branch
does not. Commit be1ba9ed221f ("wifi: mac80211: avoid weird state in error
path") hardened this same error path for the link-removal case
(new_links == 0) but left the newly-added links' teardown unaddressed.
drv_change_vif_links() can fail at runtime on MLO drivers (internal
allocation / queue / firmware command failures).
Remove the new links' debugfs entries and stop them before freeing.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888011290000 by task exploit/145
Call Trace:
...
ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)
short_proxy_read (fs/debugfs/file.c:373)
vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:572)
ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
...
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_if_read_link (net/mac80211/debugfs_netdev.c:127)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()
When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source
frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via
__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the
destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags.
If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed
receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately
owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode
SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over
pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes
kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.
All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,
skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly
propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this
convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after
__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag
unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG. |
| Use after free in Payments in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Web Authentication in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Resources in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| A maliciously crafted BMP file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products, can force a Untrusted Pointer Dereference vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. |
| Kernel software from a non-secure operating system on a platform with Trusted Execution Environment support, may cause GPU Firmware to boot up using data from non-secure memory.
The GPU thread of control (Firmware) uses a pointer from non-secure memory belonging to the Rich Execution Environment (REE) when saving or retrieving internal data between the tightly coupled private memory to main memory. An attacker with control over the REE kernel may modify the pointer value, corrupting the data used by the GPU Firmware. |
| Software installed and run as a non-privileged user may conduct improper GPU system calls to cause OOB read kernel memory access and in certain cases cause GPU UAF of arbitrary pages.
Incorrect validation of array index can lead to OOB read and potentially to GPU UAF of arbitrary pages. |
| Use after free in WebGL in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
| Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Media in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in WebGL in Google Chrome on Android prior to 151.0.7922.109 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical) |
