| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| WookTeam v1.6.6 and before is vulnerable to RCE in the project task export interface /api/project/task/export. The data parameter is base64-decoded and passed directly into the string2array() function in app/Module/Base.php, which executes eval("\$array = $data;") whenever the decoded string starts with array. An attacker can inject arbitrary PHP code into the eval call and achieve RCE. |
| A remote user validation failure vulnerability exists in HPE Integrated Lights-Out (iLO) 7 firmware. |
| A vulnerability was identified in YunaiV/zhijiantianya ruoyi-vue-pro up to 2026.08. Affected is the function updateDemoOrderPaid of the file yudao-module-pay/src/main/java/cn/iocoder/yudao/module/pay/controller/admin/demo/PayDemoOrderController.java of the component Demo-order Payment Callback Handler. The manipulation of the argument ID leads to improper authorization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in StylemixThemes Cost Calculator Builder cost-calculator-builder allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects Cost Calculator Builder: from n/a through 4.0.17. |
| A vulnerability was identified in volotat Anagnorisis up to 0.4.11. Affected by this issue is the function html of the file PlaylistManager.js of the component Media Filename Handler. Such manipulation of the argument file_path leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| authentik is an open-source identity provider. Prior to 2026.2.7, 2026.5.7, and 2026.8.2, authentik email authenticator enrollment during an authentication or enrollment flow accepts a recipient address supplied in the setup request instead of using the address already established by the flow. An actor who knows a target user's password can substitute an attacker-controlled address, receive the one-time code, and finish enrolling the factor as the target. The target must not have enrolled the email factor already. Successful enrollment gives the actor a session as the target and access to single sign-on applications behind the account. Other authenticator types are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.2.7, 2026.5.7, and 2026.8.2. |
| CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery in the Progress @progress/sitefinity-nextjs-sdk npm package versions 15.1.8326 through 15.4.8637 may allow a remote attacker to make server-side requests to an attacker-controlled host, potentially exposing sensitive information. |
| OpenWA is a free, open source, self-hosted WhatsApp API gateway. Prior to 0.23.5, the GET /api/sessions/{sessionId}/groups/{groupId}/invite-code endpoint and the GroupGetInviteCode MCP tool have no OPERATOR role requirement, allowing a valid VIEWER key scoped to a session to retrieve an active group invite code. The invite code is a transferable WhatsApp bearer capability, so an external account can join a group administered by the session without an OpenWA credential, gain read and post access to the group, and retain membership after the VIEWER key is revoked. Affected deployments are those that issue VIEWER keys to parties who should not be able to add accounts to administered groups; OPERATOR and ADMIN access is intended. This issue is fixed in version 0.23.5. |
| OpenWA is a free, open source, self-hosted WhatsApp API gateway. Prior to 0.23.5, the /events WebSocket gateway delivers the session.qr event to a VIEWER API key that subscribes by event name or through either wildcard subscription form, even though GET /api/sessions/{sessionId}/qr requires the OPERATOR role. When an allowed session is waiting to be paired, the exposed QR lets the key holder link an external device to the WhatsApp account and then read and send messages outside OpenWA and its audit trail. Keys restricted through allowedSessions remain limited to those sessions, and deployments that issue only OPERATOR or ADMIN keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.23.5. |
| The convert_playwright_script prompt in the k6 MCP server accepts a file path as its playwright_script argument. Paths given in the documented '@'-prefixed form are restricted to the server's current working directory, but a bare path is resolved by a separate undocumented code path that applies no such restriction. A caller able to invoke the prompt can therefore read any file readable by the user running the server, including files outside the working directory, and receives the file contents in the prompt response. A leading '~' is expanded to the user's home directory, so credential files such as SSH private keys are directly addressable. The working-directory restriction is additionally bypassable through a symbolic link inside the working directory that points outside it, because the path is not canonicalized before the restriction is applied. All releases from v0.3.0 onward are affected; releases v0.3.0 and v0.4.0 apply no restriction to either form. |
| ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.4.13 and 4.16.1, ZITADEL Actions V1 enables the goja Node-compatible require() registry without restricting its filesystem source loader. An organization Action author with ORG_OWNER, org.action.write, and org.flow.write permissions can run JavaScript at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points and load files readable by the ZITADEL server process. This can disclose mounted configuration and secrets, including credentials stored through ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH or ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH, and recovered bootstrap credentials can enable escalation from an organization administrator to an instance administrator. The issue affects Actions V1, and host command execution is not established. This issue is fixed in versions 3.4.13 and 4.16.1. |
| Termix is a web-based server management platform with SSH terminal, tunneling, and file editing capabilities. From 1.7.0 until 2.5.1, the Termix SSH key deployment flow derives a grep pattern from a user-controlled public-key token and interpolates it into double-quoted shell commands executed on the selected target host. In src/backend/database/routes/credential-deploy-routes.ts, both grep -F verification paths accept command substitution or quote-breaking shell syntax in keyPattern. An authenticated user who can deploy a crafted SSH credential can therefore execute commands with the selected remote account's privileges. The separate ACME command-injection report is outside this CVE's scope. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1. |
| In Progress® Telerik® Fiddler® Classic for Windows, versions prior to v6.0.20262.10021, the integrity check applied to the external helper tools launched by the application is insufficient. Before executing a helper tool, the application only verifies that the file carries a valid Authenticode signature whose certificate subject name matches a broad allow list of publisher name fragments, rather than verifying that the file is the specific executable shipped with that version of the product. A local threat actor with low privileges who replaces one of these helper executables with any other validly signed binary from an allow-listed publisher can cause the substituted binary to be executed by the application, including with Administrator privileges for the tools that request elevation, resulting in privilege escalation and execution of unintended code. Successful exploitation requires the user to launch the affected external tool and to approve the elevation prompt without noticing that it refers to a different executable. |
| TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.3.0, the get_trip_summary tool in server/src/mcp/tools/trips.ts is registered for scoped OAuth MCP tokens without requiring trips:read and returns core trip summary data regardless of the delegated scopes. A token granted only an unrelated capability, such as weather:read, can receive trip metadata, member email addresses from server/src/services/tripService.ts, itinerary days, and accommodations for every trip accessible to the token's user. Cross-user trip authorization remains enforced, but the missing scope check defeats the consented least-privilege boundary and exposes trip content and third-party contact information to an MCP client that was not authorized to read it. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.0. |
| LaSuite Doc is a collaborative note taking, wiki and documentation platform. From 4.8.2 until 5.4.0, GET /api/v1.0/documents/search/ accepts sequential seven-digit document paths to scope descendant searches without requiring the caller to possess the public document UUID. An unauthenticated caller can submit an empty search query and iterate predictable path values to enumerate public document subtrees, obtaining document identifiers, titles, creator data, timestamps, and tree metadata. Each disclosed identifier can then be used through normal public-document endpoints to retrieve the document content, and differing 403 Forbidden and 404 Not Found responses reveal whether a guessed path exists. Authenticated users can similarly discover documents with authenticated link reach, while restricted documents remain protected. This issue is fixed in version 5.4.0. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, validation of an MLS (RFC 9420) external commit's proposal list, org.bouncycastle.mls.protocol.Group.validateExternalCachedProposals, counted the proposals by type and bounded the removed leaf index but never established that the removed leaf had anything to do with the joiner. RFC 9420 sec. 12.2 permits at most one Remove proposal in an external commit, with which the joiner removes an old version of themselves, and requires that where one is present the LeafNode in the commit's path field meet the criteria it would have to meet in an Update for the removed leaf, in particular that its credential present identifiers acceptable for the removed participant. The ordinary proposal-list validator's self-remove rule is deliberately not applied on this path, because a resync commit legitimately removes a leaf the joiner owns, but nothing was put in its place. Any party holding the group's public GroupInfo, which is precisely what an external joiner is meant to be given, could therefore commit a Remove naming any member's LeafIndex and have every member apply it, evicting that member and taking over their slot in the ratchet tree. The credential check that should have prevented this existed only in the gRPC interop harness and so protected no other caller of the public Group.externalJoin and Group.handle API. An external commit carrying a Remove is now accepted only when the removed leaf's credential is identical to the one in the joiner's own new leaf, on both the sending and the receiving side. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP certificate API accepted a third-party certification or trust delegation from any component key of the issuing certificate, without requiring that component to have been granted the authority to certify. OpenPGPCertificate.getCertificationBy() and getDelegationBy() resolve a third-party signature by matching its issuer key identifier against every key of the third-party certificate, then verify the issuing component's binding chain and the signature itself; nothing checked that the issuing component carried the RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29 certification key flag (CERTIFY_OTHER) when the signature was created. A subkey bound only with SIGN_DATA - the online signing subkey of exactly the offline-primary arrangement those key flags exist to express - could therefore issue a positive User ID certification over an attacker-controlled identity, or a full-trust depth-one direct-key delegation of introducer trust, and the API returned it as a valid signature chain attributed to the third-party certificate. An application treating getCertificationBy(...).isValid() or getDelegationBy(...) as an identity or trusted-introducer decision would attribute the attacker's assertion to the offline primary key. The same held for a legacy RSA subkey bound only for encryption, whose algorithm is nonetheless able to sign. This does not forge the primary key's signature or recover any private key; it promotes an already-compromised restricted subkey to the primary key's identity-issuing authority, defeating the containment the key-flag separation provides. A third-party certification or delegation is now attributed to the issuing certificate only when the component key that made it is the primary key, or is a subkey holding CERTIFY_OTHER when the signature was created, so certification-capable subkeys continue to be accepted; primary keys are accepted whatever their key flags say, since a primary key is certification-capable by construction and certificates carrying no key flags subpacket at all are common. Third-party revocations are deliberately outside the rule, since declining to honour one would keep trust alive rather than withdraw it. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) implementation did not bind an X.509 credential to a LeafNode's signature_key. LeafNode.verify() checked a leaf's signature against the signature_key carried in the leaf itself, while the credential's X.509 certificate chain was stored but never parsed or validated, so the end-entity certificate's public key was never required to match signature_key as RFC 9420 sec. 5.3 requires. A party could therefore present another party's certificate as its credential while signing the leaf, and the enclosing KeyPackage, with an unrelated key, and be accepted under that other party's identity through KeyPackage.verify() and the Group leaf-validation path. In a deployment that admits external commits without an independent credential-admission check, an unauthenticated attacker could be admitted under a victim's X.509 identity, evict the victim (resynchronization compares whole credentials rather than signing keys), derive the current epoch, decrypt subsequent group messages, and send messages accepted as the victim. TreeKEM.LeafNode now requires the end-entity certificate's subject public key, in the cipher suite's signature encoding, to equal signature_key for an X.509 credential and rejects the leaf otherwise, including an empty chain or a certificate whose key type does not match the cipher suite; certificate-chain and identity validation to a trust anchor remain the application's responsibility per RFC 9420 sec. 5.3.1. Deployments using only basic credentials are unaffected. |
