| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: HIDP: validate numbered report payloads
When hidp_get_raw_report() waits for a numbered report,
hidp_process_data() compares the expected report number with skb->data[0].
A connected HIDP peer can reply with only a DATA transaction header,
leaving the skb empty after the header is removed.
KMSAN reports an uninitialized-value use in hidp_session_run(), with the
value originating in __alloc_skb() through vhci_write(). The transaction
header checks remove the empty-frame reports, but this report remains until
the payload check is added.
The comparison can also consume a peer-controlled byte beyond the declared
L2CAP PDU. A DATA | FEATURE response followed by an extra 0x01 byte made
the current code accept that byte as report ID 1 and complete
HIDIOCGFEATURE with a zero-byte result. With this change the malformed
response is rejected with -EIO, while a subsequent valid response still
succeeds.
Require a payload byte before comparing a numbered report ID. Unnumbered
reports continue to accept an empty payload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in vxlan_gro_prepare_receive().
udp_tunnel_sock_release() could set sk->sk_user_data to NULL
while vxlan_gro_prepare_receive() is running.
Let's check if rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() is NULL after
skb_gro_remcsum_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: zoned: fix deadlock between metadata writeback and transaction commit
When writing out metadata extent buffers in a zoned filesystem,
btree_writepages() holds fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock across the whole
writeback loop, including the call to btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() ->
check_bg_is_active().
For the tree-log block group, check_bg_is_active() may fail to activate
the zone and fall back to btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() to free an active
zone. That path waits for the running transaction to commit while still
holding zoned_meta_io_lock, but the committer needs that same lock to
write out the tree extents, so the two tasks deadlock:
Task A (kworker, metadata writeback) Task B (fsstress, transaction commit)
------------------------------------ -------------------------------------
wb_workfn() btrfs_commit_transaction(T)
btree_writepages() btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction()
btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock() btrfs_write_marked_extents()
btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer() btree_writepages()
check_bg_is_active() [treelog_bg] btrfs_zoned_meta_io_lock()
btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() <blocks on zoned_meta_io_lock,
btrfs_zone_finish() held by Task A>
do_zone_finish()
btrfs_inc_block_group_ro()
btrfs_wait_for_commit()
<blocks waiting for commit
of transaction T, done by
Task B>
The sibling branch in check_bg_is_active() already drops zoned_meta_io_lock
around do_zone_finish() for this exact reason. Do the same in the tree-log
branch: release the lock around btrfs_zone_finish_one_bg() and re-acquire
it afterwards. The lock only protects fs_info->active_{meta,system}_bg,
which this branch does not touch, and ctx->zoned_bg keeps a reference to
the block group across the unlock, so nothing is lost while the lock
is dropped.
This hang occasionally reproduces with fstests generic/475 on a zoned
btrfs filesystem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: uvcvideo: Fix deadlock if uvc_status_stop is called from async_ctrl.work
If a UVC camera has an asynchronous control, uvc_status_stop may be
called from async_ctrl.work:
uvc_ctrl_status_event_work()
uvc_ctrl_status_event()
uvc_ctrl_clear_handle()
uvc_pm_put()
uvc_status_put()
uvc_status_stop()
cancel_work_sync()
This will cause a deadlock, since cancel_work_sync will wait for
uvc_ctrl_status_event_work to complete before returning.
Fix this by returning early from uvc_status_stop if we are currently in
the work function. flush_status now remains false until uvc_status_start
is called again, ensuring that uvc_ctrl_status_event_work won't resubmit
the URB. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
raid1: fix nr_pending leak in REQ_ATOMIC bad-block error path
In raid1_write_request(), each per-mirror loop iteration begins by
incrementing rdev->nr_pending. If a REQ_ATOMIC write encounters a
badblock within the requested range, the code jumps to err_handle
without dropping the reference taken for the current mirror.
err_handle's cleanup loop will only decrements for k < i and
r1_bio->bios[k] is non-NULL. The current slot is therefore skipped,
leaving its nr_pending reference leaked permanently. The reference
prevents the rdev from ever being removed, since raid1_remove_conf()
refuses to remove an rdev with nr_pending > 0.
Fix this by calling rdev_dec_pending() before jumping to err_handle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext2: fix ignored return value of generic_write_sync()
Fix ext2_dio_write_iter() to propagate the error returned by
generic_write_sync() instead of silently discarding it, which could
cause write(2) to return success to userspace on O_SYNC/O_DSYNC files
even when the sync failed.
The correct pattern, already used in ext2_dax_write_iter() in the same
file and in ext4, xfs, f2fs among others, is:
if (ret > 0)
ret = generic_write_sync(iocb, ret);
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
[JK: Reflect also filemap_write_and_wait() return value] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: avoid stale FIFO cells during resize
snd_seq_fifo_resize() still needs to publish the replacement pool
before it waits for FIFO users. A blocking snd_seq_read() holds
f->use_lock while it sleeps, so concurrent senders must be able to
queue to the new pool and wake that reader instead of failing against a
closing old pool.
However, snd_seq_fifo_event_in() duplicates an event before it takes
f->lock, and snd_seq_read() can dequeue a cell and later call
snd_seq_fifo_cell_putback() if copy_to_user() or
snd_seq_expand_var_event() fails. If resize swaps f->pool and detaches
oldhead in between, either path can relink an old-pool cell after the
snapshot. That stale cell sits outside the drained oldhead list, keeps
oldpool->counter elevated, and can leave snd_seq_pool_delete() waiting
for the retired pool to drain.
Keep the existing swap-before-wait ordering in snd_seq_fifo_resize(),
but reject stale cells before any FIFO relink. Revalidate event-in cells
under f->lock and retry them against the published replacement pool, and
free stale putback cells instead of linking them back into the FIFO.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
resize path: relink path:
1. Allocate newpool. 1. Take f->use_lock.
2. Swap f->pool to newpool and 2. Duplicate or dequeue an old-pool
detach oldhead. cell before oldpool closes.
3. Mark oldpool closing and 3. Reach a later relink point after
wait for FIFO users. resize published newpool.
4. Free oldhead and delete 4. Relink the old-pool cell after
oldpool. resize detached oldhead.
5. Drop f->use_lock.
The reproducer reports a resize ioctl blocked in the expected pool
teardown path:
signal: resize iteration=98 target_pool=4 exceeded 250ms
(elapsed=251ms)
diagnostic: resize_tid=651 wchan=snd_seq_pool_done
diagnostic: resize_tid=651 stack=
snd_seq_pool_done+0x5b/0x140
snd_seq_pool_delete+0x7a/0x90
snd_seq_fifo_resize+0x193/0x1e0
snd_seq_ioctl_set_client_pool+0x214/0x260
snd_seq_ioctl+0x119/0x540
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xd1/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x2f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
A second run with larger pools hit the same target path:
signal: resize iteration=32 target_pool=64 exceeded 250ms
(elapsed=251ms)
diagnostic: resize_tid=663 wchan=snd_seq_pool_done
diagnostic: resize_tid=663 stack=
snd_seq_pool_done+0x5b/0x140
snd_seq_pool_delete+0x7a/0x90
snd_seq_fifo_resize+0x193/0x1e0
snd_seq_ioctl_set_client_pool+0x214/0x260
snd_seq_ioctl+0x119/0x540
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xd1/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x2f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()
KMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user():
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _inline_copy_to_user
include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120
lib/usercopy.c:26
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120 lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x2e7/0x440 net/socket.c:302
____sys_recvmsg+0x232/0x610 net/socket.c:2925
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ieee802154_addr_to_sa include/net/ieee802154_netdev.h:369 [inline]
dgram_recvmsg+0xa09/0xbe0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:739
The issue occurs because the `pan_id` field of `struct ieee802154_addr`
is left uninitialized when the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.
The execution flow is as follows:
1. `__ieee802154_rx_handle_packet()` declares a local `struct
ieee802154_hdr hdr` on the stack.
2. `ieee802154_hdr_pull()` calls `ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` to parse
the source and destination addresses into this structure.
3. If the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`,
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` previously only set the `mode` field,
leaving the `pan_id` field containing uninitialized stack memory.
4. This uninitialized `pan_id` is later copied into a `struct
sockaddr_ieee802154` in `dgram_recvmsg()` via `ieee802154_addr_to_sa()`.
5. Finally, `move_addr_to_user()` copies the socket address structure to
user space, leaking the uninitialized bytes.
Fix this by using `memset` to zero out the address structure in
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` when the mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/amd/core: Avoid enabling BRS from the SVM reload path
Branch Sampling (BRS) and Last Branch Record (LBR) are mutually
exclusive hardware features, and users of both are tracked via
cpuc->lbr_users.
When SVM is toggled on a CPU, the host perf events are reprogrammed to
update the HostOnly filter bit (set when virtualization is enabled,
cleared when it is disabled). On PerfMonV2-capable processors, this
reprogramming is performed by calling amd_pmu_enable_all() to rewrite
the event selectors. However, amd_pmu_enable_all() also calls
amd_brs_enable_all(), which enables BRS whenever cpuc->lbr_users > 0.
Having active LBR events satisfies this gating on processors that have
LBR but not BRS. The kernel then tries to set the BRS enable bit in
DebugExtnCfg (MSR 0xc000010f). Since that bit is deprecated on such
hardware, the write results in a #GP:
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
amd_pmu_enable_all+0x1d/0x90
amd_pmu_disable_virt+0x62/0xb0
kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu+0xa/0x40 [kvm]
hardware_disable_nolock+0x1a/0x30 [kvm]
__flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9b/0x410
__sysvec_call_function+0x18/0xc0
sysvec_call_function+0x69/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_call_function+0x16/0x20
RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xc4/0x450
? cpuidle_enter_state+0xb7/0x450
cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
cpuidle_idle_call+0xf5/0x160
do_idle+0x7b/0xe0
cpu_startup_entry+0x26/0x30
start_secondary+0x115/0x140
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x194/0x19b
</TASK>
Fix this by ensuring that BRS is not enabled from the event selector
reprogramming path even when cpuc->lbr_users > 0. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: cap RESTART_TABLE free-chain walker at rt->used
A crafted NTFS3 disk image triggers an in-kernel infinite loop at
mount time, hanging the mounting thread and firing the soft-lockup
watchdog within ~22s on multi-CPU hosts (panic with
kernel.softlockup_panic=1). The bug is reachable from desktop USB
auto-mount on distributions where udisks2 routes the NTFS signature
to the in-tree ntfs3 driver (Arch family and an increasing fraction
of Fedora / openSUSE / RHEL deployments); CAP_SYS_ADMIN-class manual
mount elsewhere.
check_rstbl()'s second walker iterates the free-entry singly-linked
list headed by rt->first_free with no upper bound on iteration count:
for (off = ff; off;) {
if (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED)
return false;
off = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)Add2Ptr(rt, off));
if (off > ts - sizeof(__le32))
return false;
}
The existing guards cover three exits: end-of-list (off == 0), the
in-use marker (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED), and out-of-bounds
(off > ts - sizeof(__le32)). None of the three prevents an
in-bounds cycle.
A crafted on-disk RESTART_TABLE whose free chain contains a
self-loop or A->B->A cycle whose offsets satisfy:
- in range [sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE), ts - sizeof(__le32)]
- (off - sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE)) % rsize == 0
passes all existing guards and spins the mount-time thread forever.
Reproduced in UML by hand-forging a 2 MB NTFS3 image whose journal
RESTART_TABLE first_free = 0x18 and whose entry at offset 0x18
stores 0x18 as its next pointer; mount of the forged image with
the in-tree ntfs3 driver never returns.
Bound the walker by rt->used. Each entry on a legitimate free
chain is unique, and the total slot count is ne = le16_to_cpu
(rt->used). A traversal that visits more than ne slots is by
construction malformed; reject it as a corrupt RESTART_TABLE.
After this patch, mount of the forged image returns with -EINVAL
and a log_replay failure message, and mkntfs-produced legitimate
images mount cleanly (verified in the same UML harness). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: preserve pmd_swp_uffd_wp on device-private PMD downgrade
change_non_present_huge_pmd() rewrites a writable device-private PMD swap
entry into a readable one without carrying pmd_swp_uffd_wp() across. The
PTE-level change_softleaf_pte() does this correctly; mirror that here,
matching what copy_huge_pmd() does for the fork path. Without the carry,
a plain mprotect() over a UFFD_WP-marked device-private THP strips the bit
and the trap is bypassed on swap-in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: tegra: do not call pinctrl for GPIO direction
tegra_gpio_direction_input() and tegra_gpio_direction_output() already
program the GPIO controller direction registers directly. The additional
pinctrl_gpio_direction_input/output() calls do not add a Tegra pinctrl
operation, because the Tegra pinmux ops provide GPIO request/free
handling but no gpio_set_direction hook.
The extra call still enters the pinctrl core and takes pctldev->mutex.
Shared GPIO users can call the direction path while holding their
per-line spinlock, so this otherwise redundant pinctrl direction call can
sleep in an atomic context.
This was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual
review of tegra_gpio_probe(), the Tegra GPIO direction callbacks and the
Tegra pinctrl ops. The reviewed path has a default non-sleeping
struct gpio_chip while the direction callback still enters the pinctrl
mutex path.
A directed runtime validation kept the same non-sleeping chip registration
and drove:
gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output()
gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit()
tegra_gpio_direction_output()
pinctrl_gpio_direction_output()
Lockdep reported a sleep-in-atomic warning with the shared GPIO spinlock
held and pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range() plus tegra_gpio_direction_output()
on the stack.
Do not mark the whole chip as can_sleep to paper over this: can_sleep
describes whether get()/set() may sleep, and Tegra value access is MMIO.
Remove the redundant pinctrl direction calls and keep pinctrl involvement
in the existing request/free path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: ca8210: fix pointer truncation in kfifo on 64-bit
ca8210_test_int_driver_write() and ca8210_test_int_user_read() exchange
a kmalloc'd buffer pointer through a struct kfifo, but pass a literal
'4' as the byte count to kfifo_in()/kfifo_out().
This is correct on 32-bit (pointer = 4 bytes), but on 64-bit only the
low 4 bytes of the 8-byte pointer are written into the FIFO. The reader
then reads back 4 bytes into an 8-byte local pointer variable, leaving
the upper 4 bytes uninitialized stack data. The first dereference of
the reconstructed pointer (fifo_buffer[1]) accesses an arbitrary kernel
address and generally results in an oops.
Use sizeof(fifo_buffer) so the byte count matches pointer width on every
architecture.
The driver has no architecture restriction in Kconfig, so any 64-bit
build with CONFIG_IEEE802154_CA8210_DEBUGFS=y is exposed. Issue has
been latent since the driver was added in 2017 because it is most
commonly deployed on 32-bit MCUs.
Found via a custom Coccinelle semantic patch hunting for short-byte
kfifo I/O on byte-mode kfifos used to shuttle pointers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission
Fix rxrpc_receiving_reply() to handle the reception of an apparent reply
DATA packet before rxrpc has had a chance to send any request DATA packets
on a client call by checking to see if the call has been exposed yet by
sending the first packet.
Without this, rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() might oops.
Also fix rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to handle the Tx queue being empty by
changing the do...while loop into a while loop, just in case a call is
abnormally terminated by an early reply before the last request packet is
transmitted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays
The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local
storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check
treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored
storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail
call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even
though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's
context, that is, A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) path.
Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a
storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one.
Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot
perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -> B(no storage) working
while rejecting the A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) bridge. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: watchdog: fix refcount tracking races
Blamed commit converted the untracked dev_hold()/dev_put() calls
in the watchdog code to use the tracked dev_hold_track()/dev_put_track()
(which were later renamed/interfaced to netdev_hold() and netdev_put()).
By introducing dev->watchdog_dev_tracker to store the
reference tracking information without adding synchronization
between netdev_watchdog_up() and dev_watchdog(), it enabled the
race condition where this pointer could be overwritten or freed
concurrently, leading to the list corruption crash syzbot reported:
list_del corruption, ffff888114a18c00->next is NULL
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 91 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026
Workqueue: events_unbound linkwatch_event
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report.cold+0x22/0x2a lib/list_debug.c:52
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:246 [inline]
list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:341 [inline]
ref_tracker_free+0x1a7/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:329
netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4491 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4508 [inline]
netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4504 [inline]
netdev_watchdog_down net/sched/sch_generic.c:600 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x28c/0xfe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1363
dev_deactivate+0x109/0x1d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1397
linkwatch_do_dev net/core/link_watch.c:184 [inline]
linkwatch_do_dev+0xd3/0x120 net/core/link_watch.c:166
__linkwatch_run_queue+0x3a5/0x810 net/core/link_watch.c:240
linkwatch_event+0x8f/0xc0 net/core/link_watch.c:314
process_one_work+0xa0e/0x1980 kernel/workqueue.c:3314
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3397 [inline]
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3478
kthread+0x370/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x69a/0xc80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
This patch has three coordinated parts:
1) Add dev->watchdog_lock and dev->watchdog_ref_held to serialize watchdog operations.
2) Remove netdev_watchdog_up() call from netif_carrier_on():
This ensures netdev_watchdog_up() is only called from process/BH context
(via linkwatch workqueue dev_activate()), allowing us to use
spin_lock_bh() for synchronization.
3) Synchronize watchdog up and watchdog timer:
Protect netdev_watchdog_up() with tx_global_lock and watchdog_lock.
Only allocate a new tracker in netdev_watchdog_up() if one is
not already present.
In dev_watchdog(), ensure we don't release the tracker if the
timer was rescheduled either by dev_watchdog() itself or concurrently
by netdev_watchdog_up(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix folio state after ENOMEM whilst under writeback iteration
Fix the state of the current folio when ENOMEM occurs during writeback
iteration. The folio needs to be redirtied and unlocked before the
terminal writeback_iter() is invoked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xprtrdma: Initialize re_id before removal registration
rpcrdma_create_id() registers ep->re_rn with the rpcrdma ib_client
before returning the new rdma_cm_id to rpcrdma_ep_create(). However
rpcrdma_ep_create() currently stores that pointer in ep->re_id only
after rpcrdma_create_id() returns.
A local administrator can race an NFS/RDMA mount against RDMA device
removal. If rpcrdma_remove_one() observes the just-registered
notification before rpcrdma_ep_create() assigns ep->re_id,
rpcrdma_ep_removal_done() calls trace_xprtrdma_device_removal(NULL).
The tracepoint dereferences id->device->name and copies
id->route.addr.dst_addr, so the callback can crash the kernel with a
NULL pointer dereference.
Store the rdma_cm_id in ep->re_id immediately before publishing
ep->re_rn. The existing error path still destroys the id directly if
registration fails; ep is then freed by the caller without using
ep->re_id. Remove the later duplicate assignment in rpcrdma_ep_create(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix potential deadlock in mpi3mr_fault_uevent_emit
mpi3mr_fault_uevent_emit() runs from the fault watchdog and reset paths
where host I/O may already be blocked. GFP_KERNEL allocations here, both
the local kzalloc_obj() and the ones inside kobject_uevent_env() itself,
can trigger reclaim that waits on that blocked I/O and deadlock.
Use memalloc_noio_save()/restore() to cover the whole call instead of
just the local allocation. |
