| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: respect peer refcount in CMD_NEW_PEER error path
ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit()'s error path calls ovpn_peer_release() directly
rather than ovpn_peer_put(), bypassing the kref. The accompanying
comment ("peer was not yet hashed, thus it is not used in any context")
holds for UDP but not for TCP.
For UDP, the ovpn_socket union uses the .ovpn arm and never points back
at a peer; UDP encap_recv looks up peers via the not-yet-populated
hashtables, so the new peer is unreachable until ovpn_peer_add()
publishes it.
For TCP, ovpn_socket_new() sets ovpn_sock->peer and
ovpn_tcp_socket_attach() publishes ovpn_sock via rcu_assign_sk_user_data().
From that moment until ovpn_socket_release() detaches in the error path,
the TCP fd is fully wired: userspace recvmsg / sendmsg / close / poll
on the fd, as well as the strparser-driven ovpn_tcp_rcv() path, can
reach the peer through sk_user_data -> ovpn_sock->peer and bump its
refcount via ovpn_peer_hold().
ovpn_tcp_socket_wait_finish() (called inside ovpn_socket_release())
drains strparser and the tx work, but does not synchronize with
userspace syscall callers that already hold a peer reference. If
ovpn_nl_peer_modify() or ovpn_peer_add() returns an error while such
a caller is in flight - notably an ovpn_tcp_recvmsg() blocked in
__skb_recv_datagram() on peer->tcp.user_queue - the direct
ovpn_peer_release() destroys the peer while the caller still holds
the reference, and the eventual ovpn_peer_put() from that caller
operates on freed memory.
Replace the direct destructor call with ovpn_peer_put() so the kref
correctly defers destruction until the last reference is dropped.
In the common case where no concurrent user is present, behaviour is
unchanged: the kref hits zero immediately and ovpn_peer_release_kref()
runs the same destructor.
With this conversion ovpn_peer_release() has no callers outside peer.c
- ovpn_peer_release_kref() in the same translation unit is the only
remaining user - so make it static and drop its declaration from
peer.h. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Clear wcid pointer in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link()
Clear WCID pointer removing the sta link in mt7996_mac_sta_deinit_link
routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(),
llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform
in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a
scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area
and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API
(e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).
On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb
before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The
cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference
counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared
buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially
belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.
On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has
been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).
The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto
operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments,
it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in
place. This is the same pattern used by:
- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
- MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
- WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
- TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)
Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
- Silent data corruption of other skb clones
- Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a
page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
- Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security
enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths
A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================ =========================
create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
get auth key
load rka from auth key
copy user payload
sleep on #PF
helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
wake up
use rka->target_key
**USE-AFTER-FREE**
Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.
[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
concurrency scenario.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/file.c:845!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x1115/0x1140 fs/f2fs/file.c:845
Code: fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 8b 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b e8 83 9d 9a fd 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 60 d1 1a 8c e8 54 f1 fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 6c 9d 9a fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 64 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 93 fd ff ff e8 56 9d 9a fd 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e4474c0 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: ffffffff842b1d34 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000100000
RDX: ffffc9000f03a000 RSI: 0000000000035503 RDI: 0000000000035504
RBP: ffffc9000e447608 R08: ffff8880123b0000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: 00000000fffffffe R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff92001c88ea0 R15: 00000000ffff039c
FS: 00007f7e02ee36c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c887000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff0305c4000 CR3: 0000000012d4c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:882
f2fs_truncate+0x471/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:940
f2fs_evict_inode+0xa3f/0x1ac0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:907
evict+0x61e/0xb10 fs/inode.c:841
f2fs_fill_super+0x5f43/0x78f0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5224
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x431/0x4f0 fs/super.c:1694
vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1754
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline]
do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3758 [inline]
do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 fs/namespace.c:3834
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4167 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4383 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4360
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
count = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode);
count -= dn.ofs_in_node;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, count < 0);
The fuzz test will trigger above bug_on in f2fs.
The root cause should be: in the corrupted inode, there is a direct node
which has the same ino and nid in its footer, so in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(),
after f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() finds such dnode:
1) ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode) will return 923
2) once dn.ofs_in_node points to addr[923, 1017]
Then it will trigger the system panic.
Let's introduce NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE to indicate current node should
not be an inode or xattr node, and then use it in below path to detect
inconsistent node chain in inode mapping table:
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_get_dnode_of_data
- f2fs_get_node_folio_ra
- __get_node_folio
- f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer
- case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE -> check whether it is inode|xnode |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node()
When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does
not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode
folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward,
the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the
following error in xfstests generic/388:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix
In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to
guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback
is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.
This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between
extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero
check of et->node_cnt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):
brelse(bh);
if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
...
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
...
}
After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").
Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.
Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0
With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush()
When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently,
a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's
__blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via
llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds
to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.
Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release()
(before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any
concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.
Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
Workqueue: events_unbound
Call Trace:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 169:
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Freed by task 8:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.
Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().
Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()
When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.
Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors
ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.
Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
_find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
__bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path
When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases
oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent,
the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid)
unconditionally.
This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains
with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and
destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or
put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow.
Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not
alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below.
This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple
p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer
and refcount warning logs are available on request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: omap2: fix use-after-free in omapfb_mmap
omapfb_mmap() has a race condition with OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE ioctl that
can lead to use-after-free:
The fb_mmap() entry point holds mm_lock but not lock (fb_info->lock),
while ioctl handlers like OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE hold lock but not mm_lock.
This allows concurrent execution.
In omapfb_mmap():
1. rg = omapfb_get_mem_region(ofbi->region); // Get old region ref
2. start = omapfb_get_region_paddr(ofbi); // Read from NEW region
3. len = fix->smem_len; // Read from NEW region
4. vm_iomap_memory(vma, start, len); // Map NEW region memory
5. atomic_inc(&rg->map_count); // Increment OLD region!
Concurrently, OMAPFB_SETUP_PLANE can:
- Reassign ofbi->region = new_rg
- Update fix->smem_len
- OMAPFB_SETUP_MEM then checks NEW region's map_count (0!) and frees it
This leaves userspace with a mapping to freed physical memory.
The fix is to read all required values (start, len) from the same
region reference (rg) that will have its map_count incremented,
preventing the region from being freed while still mapped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup
nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.
Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.
The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.
Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of key in del_async path
In tcp_ao_delete_key(), the del_async path skips the current_key
and rnext_key validity checks present in the synchronous path,
assuming these pointers are always NULL on LISTEN sockets. However,
if a key was added with set_current=1/set_rnext=1 while the socket
was in CLOSE state, current_key and rnext_key will be non-NULL
after listen() transitions the socket to LISTEN.
When such a key is deleted with del_async=1, hlist_del_rcu() and
call_rcu() free the key without clearing the dangling pointers.
After the RCU grace period, getsockopt(TCP_AO_INFO) dereferences
current_key->sndid and rnext_key->rcvid from freed slab memory.
Clear current_key and rnext_key in the del_async path when they
reference the key being deleted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before replacing page cache folio
fuse_try_move_folio() unlocks the request on entry but does not
re-lock it on the success path. This means fuse_chan_abort() can end the
request and free the fuse_io_args (eg fuse_readpages_end()) while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_try_move_folio() accesses the
fuse_io_args, leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by calling lock_request() before replace_page_cache_folio().
This ensures the request is locked on the success path which will
prevent the fuse_io_args from being freed while the later copying logic
runs, and also ensures that the ap->folios[i]->mapping is never null
since ap->folios[i] will always point to the newfolio after
replace_page_cache_folio(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails
dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port()
and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If
clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the
8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives
in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port
slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is
rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still
references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out
callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a
use-after-free hazard.
Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount
iput() called from fuse_release_end() can Oops if the super block has
already been destroyed. Normally this is prevented by waiting for
num_waiting to go down to zero before commencing with super block shutdown.
This only works, however, for the last submount instance, as the wait
counter is per connection, not per superblock.
Revert to using synchronous release requests for the auto_submounts case,
which is virtiofs only at this time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rzv2h-ivc: Fix concurrent buffer list access
The list of buffers (`rzv2h_ivc::buffers.queue`) is protected by a
spinlock (`rzv2h_ivc::buffers.lock`). However, in
`rzv2h_ivc_transfer_buffer()`, which runs in a separate workqueue, the
`list_del()` call is executed without holding the spinlock, which makes
it possible for the list to be concurrently modified
Fix that by removing a buffer from the list in the lock protected section.
[assign ivc->buffers.curr in critical section as reported by Barnabas] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: zero-initialize GART table on allocation
GART TLB is flushed after unmapping but not after mapping. Since
amdgpu_bo_create_kernel() does not zero-initialize the buffer, when a
single PTE is written the TLB may speculatively load other uninitialized
entries from the same cacheline. Those garbage entries can appear valid,
and a subsequent write to another PTE in the same cacheline may cause the
GPU to use a stale garbage PTE from the TLB.
Fix this by calling memset_io() to zero-initialize the GART table with
gart_pte_flags immediately after allocation.
Using AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, SDMA-based clear will not work
since SDMA needs GART to be initialized to work.
(cherry picked from commit d9af8263b82b6eaa60c5718e0c6631c5037e4b24) |
