| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-rdma: handle inline data with a nonzero offset
nvmet_rdma_use_inline_sg() maps the host-controlled inline data offset
into the per-command inline scatterlist. The bounds check admits any
offset with off + len <= inline_data_size, but the mapping still assumes
the data begins in the first inline page:
sg->offset = off;
sg->length = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
When a port is configured with inline_data_size > PAGE_SIZE (settable up
to max(SZ_16K, PAGE_SIZE)), an offset in (PAGE_SIZE, inline_data_size]
makes "PAGE_SIZE - off" underflow, so sg->length is set to ~4 GiB and
the block backend reads far past the first inline page. num_pages(len)
also ignores the offset, so an in-bounds offset whose [off, off+len)
span crosses a page boundary under-counts the scatterlist.
Map the offset properly: split it into a page index and an in-page
offset, start the scatterlist at that page, and size the page count from
page_off + len. Because the request scatterlist may now start at
inline_sg[page_idx] rather than inline_sg[0], generalize the inline-SGL
identity test in nvmet_rdma_release_rsp() to a range test; otherwise the
persistent inline scatterlist is mistaken for an allocated one and
nvmet_req_free_sgls() frees an inline page (and warns in
free_large_kmalloc()). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drbd: reject data replies with an out-of-range payload size
recv_dless_read() receives a P_DATA_REPLY from a peer into the bio of an
outstanding read request. The peer-supplied payload length reaches it as
the signed int data_size, and two peer-controlled inputs can make it
negative. With a negotiated data-integrity-alg the digest length is
subtracted first, so a reply whose payload is smaller than the digest
underflows data_size. With no integrity algorithm (the default) data_size
is assigned from the unsigned h95/h100 wire length and drbdd() never
bounds it for a payload-carrying command, so a length above INT_MAX casts
it negative; this path needs no non-default feature. The bio receive loop
then computes expect = min_t(int, data_size, bv_len), which is negative,
and drbd_recv_all_warn(mapped, expect) receives with a size_t of SIZE_MAX
into the first mapped page.
The sibling receive path read_in_block() is not affected: it uses an
unsigned size and rejects it against DRBD_MAX_BIO_SIZE before receiving.
Reject a data reply whose size is negative after the optional digest
subtraction, covering both triggers.
Impact: a malicious or man-in-the-middle DRBD peer copies attacker-chosen
bytes past a bio page in the receiver, corrupting kernel memory. A node
that reads from its peer (a diskless node, or read-balancing to the peer)
is exposed in the default configuration; data-integrity-alg is not
required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject negative const offsets for buffer pointers
The verifier rejects variable offsets for PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF
accesses, but it currently accepts a constant negative offset produced by
pointer arithmetic.
Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for
pointers") moved constant pointer offsets from reg->off to reg->var_off.
However, __check_buffer_access() continued to check only the instruction
offset. An access with reg->var_off equal to -8 and an instruction offset
of zero therefore passes verification.
For writable raw tracepoints, the access end is also calculated from the
unsigned reg->var_off.value. An eight-byte access starting at -8 wraps
the calculated end to zero, allowing the program to load and attach
without increasing max_tp_access.
After ensuring that reg->var_off is constant, calculate the effective
access start using signed arithmetic and reject it when it is negative.
Use the validated start to calculate the access end for both
PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER and PTR_TO_BUF. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cake: reject overhead values that underflow length
CAKE accepts signed overhead values and stores them in an s16, but the
adjusted packet length calculation uses unsigned arithmetic. A negative
effective length can therefore wrap to a large value.
Such configurations make rate accounting depend on integer wraparound
rather than on the packet size userspace intended to model. A static
netlink lower bound is not enough because packets reaching CAKE can be
smaller than any reasonable manual-overhead allowance.
Fold the signed overhead adjustment into the existing datapath MPU clamp
so negative adjusted lengths are clamped before link-layer framing
adjustments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Use u64 multiplication in update_rlimit_cpu()
update_rlimit_cpu() converts the RLIMIT_CPU value to nanoseconds with
u64 nsecs = rlim_new * NSEC_PER_SEC;
On 32-bit kernels both rlim_new (unsigned long) and NSEC_PER_SEC
(1000000000L) are 32-bit, so the multiplication is performed in unsigned
long and truncated for rlim_new > 4 seconds before being widened to u64.
The same file already casts to u64 for the matching computation in
check_process_timers():
u64 softns = (u64)soft * NSEC_PER_SEC;
As a result, the truncated value is installed into the CPUCLOCK_PROF
expiry cache (nextevt), causing the process CPU timer to be programmed
to fire prematurely for any RLIMIT_CPU soft limit >= 5 seconds. The
actual SIGXCPU/SIGKILL decision in check_process_timers() already casts
to u64 and is therefore correct, so limit enforcement is not broken;
only the expiry-cache programming is wrong. Apply the same cast here so
both paths convert rlim_cur identically.
64-bit kernels are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix uint32_t overflow in EOP ring buffer size alignment
eop_ring_buffer_size in struct queue_properties is a u32. In
kfd_queue_acquire_buffers() the expected EOP buffer size is computed as
ALIGN(eop_ring_buffer_size, PAGE_SIZE); ALIGN uses typeof(x), so the
addition is done in 32-bit. A user-supplied size of 0xFFFFF001 wraps to
0, causing kfd_queue_buffer_get() to skip its exact-size check (gated on
size != 0) and accept any BO mapped at the address. On GFX8/GFX9 the MQD
cp_hqd_eop_control is then programmed for an 8KB EOP ring backed by a 4KB
BO, so CP EOP writes can land past the buffer and fault the GPU.
Cast the operand to u64 so the alignment is computed in 64-bit; the size
check in kfd_queue_buffer_get() then rejects the oversized request.
(cherry picked from commit ae443117b742c357bfef3a7bddabf76fcf86e9ef) |
| A flaw was found in open-iscsi. An integer underflow vulnerability in the `iscsiuio` component, specifically during IPv4 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) parsing, allows a remote attacker on the same local network segment to cause a denial of service. By sending a specially crafted IPv4/UDP DHCP reply, the attacker can trigger an out-of-bounds read, leading to the `iscsiuio` process crashing. This issue affects systems where `iscsiuio` is actively handling IPv4 DHCP traffic. |
| OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts is an experimental library for developing applications on the Zama fhEVM. Prior to 0.3.1, the ERC7984 contract tracked confidential total supply with an euint64 value, and an overflowing internal _mint operation could fail silently. The wrap and onTransferReceived functions in contracts/token/ERC7984/extensions/ERC7984ERC20Wrapper.sol did not handle that failure, so a user could transfer the underlying token without receiving the corresponding confidential wrapped token. With the default rate(), the wrapper fills after approximately 18.4 trillion tokens, and subsequent wrapping requests can cause loss of funds. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.1. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| llama.cpp builds b1886 through b7445 contain an integer overflow vulnerability in the LLaMA-Android JNI wrapper where the new_1batch() function multiplies sizeof(llama_seq_id) by an attacker-controlled n_seq_max parameter without overflow validation, causing heap buffer allocation to wrap and allocate insufficient memory. Attackers can exploit this by providing a crafted n_seq_max value through a malicious model file or JNI call to trigger heap corruption and achieve denial of service or arbitrary code execution on Android applications using the LLaMA-Android binding. |
| TimescaleDB through 2.29.1, fixed in commit 517c13e, contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the Gorilla compression reverse row iterator that allows authenticated attackers to cause a denial of service by storing a crafted compressed datum with an internally inconsistent BitArray. Attackers with DML access to a compressed hypertable can trigger an unsigned integer wraparound in the reverse iterator bucket index computation, causing a read beyond the end of the bucket array, resulting in a SIGSEGV crash that can be repeatedly triggered on each subsequent reverse-order scan. |
| FFmpeg versions from 0.5 up to, but not including, 9.0 contain a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the DVB subtitle parser in libavcodec/dvbsub_parser.c that allows attackers to trigger a heap buffer overflow by supplying a crafted WTV file. The overflow causes the bounds-check guard expression to wrap to INT_MIN, bypassing the PARSE_BUF_SIZE comparison and invoking memcpy() with attacker-controlled data into a heap buffer, resulting in an out-of-bounds heap write and potential memory corruption or code execution. |
| rsync 3.1.0 before 3.5.0 contains a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the I/O timeout implementation that allows attackers to permanently disable connection timeouts by injecting MSG_IO_TIMEOUT messages carrying non-positive (zero or negative) values. Attackers can craft malicious MSG_IO_TIMEOUT messages that cause the timeout variable to wrap to a non-positive value, preventing the timeout check from firing and enabling idle or stalled connections to hold daemon slots indefinitely, leading to resource exhaustion. |
| llama.cpp builds b4882 through b9058 contain a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the KV cache state restore path where the state_read_data() function computes write size without overflow checking, allowing attackers with write access to the slot_save_path directory to corrupt heap memory. Attackers can craft malicious state files where cell_count multiplication overflows or exceeds tensor buffer allocation to write attacker-controlled bytes past buffer boundaries, potentially resulting in heap metadata corruption, model weight corruption, or arbitrary code execution via function pointer overwrite. |
| llama.cpp builds b3978 through b9058 contain an integer underflow and out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the DRY sampler that allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger a heap buffer underflow by sending a crafted HTTP request with dry_allowed_length set to INT32_MIN to the /v1/completions or /v1/chat/completions endpoints. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to crash the server with SIGSEGV causing denial of service for all connected users, or corrupt token sampling probabilities by reading garbage values from memory before the allocated buffer. |
| llama.cpp builds b1283 through b9058 contain an integer overflow vulnerability in the llama_batch_init() function where unchecked multiplications in malloc() calls can wrap past INT32_MAX when computing allocation sizes. Attackers can pass specially crafted parameters to trigger integer overflow, causing heap corruption and potentially achieving arbitrary code execution through subsequent batch operations that write past allocated buffer boundaries. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
| Integer underflow (wrap or wraparound) in Windows DHCP Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over an adjacent network. |
