| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virt: sev-guest: Explicitly leak pages in unknown state
When set_memory_{encrypted,decrypted}() fail, the user cannot know at which
point the function failed, meaning that the pages are left in an unknown state
from the point of view of the caller.
Since the pages may be left in an unencrypted state, they are not suitable for
general use, and cannot be returned safely to the buddy allocator. Avoid the
issue by never freeing the pages, and then do the proper accounting by calling
snp_leak_pages(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Reject restored DTE with out-of-range num_eventid_bits
Userspace can restore an ITS Device Table Entry whose Size field encodes
more EventID bits than the virtual ITS supports. The live MAPD path
rejects that state, but vgic_its_restore_dte() accepts it and stores the
out-of-range value in dev->num_eventid_bits.
Reject restored DTEs with num_eventid_bits > VITS_TYPER_IDBITS before
allocating the device. This mirrors the MAPD check and prevents the
restored state from reaching vgic_its_restore_itt(), where the unchecked
value can be converted into an oversized scan_its_table() range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: Fix UAF read of dev->name
bnep_add_connection() needs to keep holding the bnep_session_sem while
reading dev->name (just like bnep_get_connlist() does); otherwise the
bnep_session() thread can concurrently free the net_device, which can for
example be triggered by a concurrent bnep_del_connection().
(This UAF is fairly uninteresting from a security perspective;
calling bnep_add_connection() requires passing a capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)
check. It also requires completely tearing down a netdev during a fairly
tight race window.) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: iosm: fix potential memory leaks in ipc_imem_init()
The memory allocated in ipc_protocol_init() is not freed on the error
paths that follow in ipc_imem_init(). Fix that by calling the
corresponding release function ipc_protocol_deinit() in the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory_hotplug: fix memory block reference leak on remove
Patch series "mm: Fix memory block leaks and locking", v2.
This series fixes two memory block device reference leaks and one locking
issue around the per-memory_block hwpoison counter.
This patch (of 2):
remove_memory_blocks_and_altmaps() looks up each memory block with
find_memory_block(), which acquires a reference to the memory block
device.
That reference is never dropped on this path, resulting in a leaked device
reference when removing memory blocks and their altmaps. Drop the
reference after retrieving mem->altmap and clearing mem->altmap, before
removing the memory block device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: pcm512x: fix null-ptr dereference in pcm512x_overclock_xxx_put()
In the pcm512x chipset driver, pcm512x_overclock_xxx_put() is defined as
a general mixer kcontrol instead of a DAPM kcontrol, so struct
snd_soc_dapm_context must not be accessed via
snd_soc_dapm_kcontrol_to_dapm().
This causes a NULL pointer dereference, so it must be modified to use
snd_soc_component_to_dapm(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix busy dentry used after unmounting
Since commit 340cea84f691c ("cifs: open files should not hold ref on
superblock"), cifs file only holds the dentry ref_cnt, the cifs file
close work(cfile->deferred) could be executed after unmounting, which
will trigger a warning in generic_shutdown_super:
BUG: Dentry 00000000a14a6845{i=c,n=file} still in use (1) [unmount of
cifs cifs]
The detailed processs is:
process A process B kworker
fd = open(PATH)
vfs_open
file->__f_path = *path // dentry->d_lockref.count = 1
cifs_open
cifs_new_fileinfo
cfile->dentry = dget(dentry) // dentry->d_lockref.count = 2
close(fd)
__fput
cifs_close
queue_delayed_work(deferredclose_wq, cfile->deferred)
dput(dentry) // dentry->d_lockref.count = 1
smb2_deferred_work_close
_cifsFileInfo_put
list_del(&cifs_file->flist)
umount
cleanup_mnt
deactivate_super
cifs_kill_sb
cifs_close_all_deferred_files_sb
cifs_close_all_deferred_files
// cannot find cfile, skip _cifsFileInfo_put
kill_anon_super
generic_shutdown_super
shrink_dcache_for_umount
umount_check
WARN ! // dentry->d_lockref.count = 1
cifsFileInfo_put_final
dput(cifs_file->dentry)
// dentry->d_lockref.count = 0
Fix it by flushing 'deferredclose_wq' before calling kill_anon_super.
Fetch a reproducer in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221548. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Set veventq_depth upper bound
iommufd_veventq_alloc() accepts any !0 veventq_depth from userspace, with
an upper bound at U32_MAX.
This leaves a vulnerability where userspace can allocate excessively large
queues to exhaust kernel memory reserves.
Cap the veventq_depth (maximum number of entries) to 1 << 19, matching the
maximum number of entries in the SMMUv3 EVTQ (the largest use case today). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Move vevent memory allocation outside spinlock
The veventq memory allocation happens inside the spinlock. Given its depth
is decided by the user space, this leaves a vulnerability, where userspace
can allocate large queues to exhaust atomic memory reserves.
Move the allocation outside the spinlock and use GFP_NOWAIT, which can fail
fast under memory pressure without dipping into the GFP_ATOMIC reserves or
direct-reclaiming from the threaded IRQ handler. On allocation failure,
queue the lost_events_header (so userspace learns of the drop) and return
-ENOMEM so the caller learns of the kernel-side memory pressure.
This is intentionally distinct from the queue-overflow path, which also
queues the lost_events_header but returns 0: a full queue is an expected
userspace-pacing condition rather than a kernel error.
A subsequent change will cap the upper bound of the veventq_depth. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read
The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT
path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):
if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) &&
sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) {
hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr)
evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses
sizeof(*hdr) consistently:
if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) {
...
if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) {
...
done += sizeof(*hdr);
struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields,
flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two
expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.
On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by
4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed
count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check,
then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len
bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.
It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct
iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check
should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer
width.
Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual
amount that will be copied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap
Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's
idmap. This results in odd edgecases like:
1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied
In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to
it.
Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.
The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access
The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a
valid section while advancing the iterator. When dynamically adding
memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference
during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when
iterator count equals __pgcount.
The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop
increment. for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext =
page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)" at the end. This causes page_ext_iter_next()
to increment iter->index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn
+ __pgcount). During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn +
__pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized,
causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
[ 14.555124][ T846] Call trace:
[ 14.555125][ T846] lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P)
[ 14.555127][ T846] page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c
[ 14.555129][ T846] __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260
[ 14.571201][ T846] __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0
[ 14.571204][ T846] __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0
[ 14.571206][ T846] generic_online_page+0x14/0x24
[ 14.597782][ T846] online_pages+0x178/0x30c
[ 14.597784][ T846] memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c
[ 14.597787][ T846] memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64
[ 14.597789][ T846] device_online+0x88/0xb0
[ 14.597791][ T846] online_memory_block+0x30/0x40
[ 14.597793][ T846] walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8
[ 14.597794][ T846] add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298
[ 14.656161][ T846] add_memory+0x60/0x98
Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so
callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the
output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the
accumulated name length:
if (++order == 2)
uniname = p_uniname->name;
else
uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
name_len += len;
unichar = *(uniname+len);
*(uniname+len) = 0x0;
uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len
grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name
fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is
`name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short
name fragments lets uniname run far past the
p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small,
causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).
The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops
on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard
added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds
max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the
equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a
fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would
exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC
POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that
specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the
O_ACCMODE access mode.
nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to
nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the
client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the
can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is
derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a
file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the
local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is
issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid,
which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics.
POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES.
Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local
check matches the access the server would have enforced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix double-free of tx_buf skb
If ice_tso() or ice_tx_csum() fail, the error path in
ice_xmit_frame_ring() frees the skb, but the 'first' tx_buf still points
to it and is marked as valid (ICE_TX_BUF_SKB).
'next_to_use' remains unchanged, so the potential problem will
likely fix itself when the next packet is transmitted and the tx_buf
gets overwritten. But if there is no next packet and the interface is
brought down instead, ice_clean_tx_ring() -> ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf()
will find the tx_buf and free the skb for the second time.
The fix is to reset the tx_buf type to ICE_TX_BUF_EMPTY in the error
path, so that ice_unmap_and_free_tx_buf().
Move the initialization of 'first' up, to ensure it's already valid in
case we hit the linearization error path.
The bug was spotted by AI while I had it looking for something else.
It also proposed an initial version of the patch.
I reproduced the bug and tested the fix by adding code to inject
failures, on a build with KASAN.
I looked for similar bugs in related Intel drivers and did not find any. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipc: limit next_id allocation to the valid ID range
The checkpoint/restore sysctl path can request the next SysV IPC id
through ids->next_id. ipc_idr_alloc() currently forwards that request to
idr_alloc() with an open-ended upper bound.
If the valid tail of the SysV IPC id space is full, the allocation can
spill beyond ipc_mni. The returned SysV IPC id still uses the normal
index encoding, so later lookup and removal can target the wrong slot.
This leaves the real IDR entry behind and breaks the IDR state for the
object.
The bug is in ipc_idr_alloc() in the checkpoint/restore path.
1. ids->next_id is passed to:
idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new, ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0, ...)
2. The zero upper bound makes the allocation effectively open-ended.
Once the valid SysV IPC tail is occupied, idr_alloc() can spill past
ipc_mni and allocate an entry beyond the valid IPC id range.
3. The new object id is still encoded with the narrower SysV IPC index
width:
new->id = (new->seq << ipcmni_seq_shift()) + idx
4. Later removal goes through ipc_rmid(), which uses:
ipcid_to_idx(ipcp->id)
That truncates the real IDR index. An object actually stored at a
high index can then be removed as if it lived at a low in-range
index.
5. For shared memory, shm_destroy() frees the current object anyway, but
the real high IDR slot is left behind as a dangling pointer.
6. A subsequent walk of /proc/sysvipc/shm reaches the stale IDR entry
and dereferences freed memory.
Prevent this by bounding the requested allocation to ipc_mni so the
checkpoint/restore path fails once the valid range is exhausted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err()
Oskar Kjos reported the following problem.
ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written
by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes
IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region
as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff
at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr
value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled
packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data,
a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE).
To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos.
Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netdev: fix double-free in netdev_nl_bind_rx_doit()
Sashiko flags that genlmsg_reply() always consumes the skb.
The error path calls nlmsg_free(rsp) so we can't jump directly
to it. Let's not unbind, just propagate the error to the user.
This is the typical way of handling genlmsg_reply() failures.
They shouldn't happen unless user does something silly like
calling the kernel with an already-full rcvbuf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix double free and use-after-free in aux device error paths
When auxiliary_device_add() fails in idpf_plug_vport_aux_dev() or
idpf_plug_core_aux_dev(), the err_aux_dev_add label calls
auxiliary_device_uninit() and falls through to err_aux_dev_init. The
uninit call will trigger put_device(), which invokes the release
callback (idpf_vport_adev_release / idpf_core_adev_release) that frees
iadev. The fall-through then reads adev->id from the freed iadev for
ida_free() and double-frees iadev with kfree().
Free the IDA slot and clear the back-pointer before uninit, while adev
is still valid, then return immediately.
Commit 65637c3a1811 ("idpf: fix UAF in RDMA core aux dev deinitialization")
fixed the same use-after-free in the matching unplug path in this file but
missed both probe error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET records
__audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the
inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit
record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value
of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable.
This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic
analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to
prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked
in the audit trail.
The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET
audit records in 2008. |
