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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-52737 | 1 Zcashfoundation | 2 Zebra, Zebra-consensus | 2026-08-18 | 5.3 Medium |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious unauthenticated P2P peer can answer Zebra's outbound getblocks or FindBlocks request with a small two-hash inventory and then serve a syntactically valid block whose coinbase height is far above the local chain tip. In zebrad/src/components/sync/downloads.rs, BlockDownloadVerifyError::AboveLookaheadHeightLimit originally carried only the block height and hash, so handle_block_response could not attribute the failure to the advertising peer. The error then reached the restart-worthy default path in zebrad/src/components/sync.rs, cancelling all in-flight downloads from honest peers and imposing a 67-second sync restart delay on mainnet. Because the peer was neither scored nor disconnected, the peer could repeat the cycle indefinitely with minimal bandwidth and significantly degrade synchronization without corrupting state. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-40880 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra-consensus, Zebrad, Zebra-consensus and 1 more | 2026-04-27 | 8.1 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By carefully submitting a transaction that is valid for height H+1 but invalid for H+2 and then mining that transaction in a block at height H+2, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This vulnerability is fixed in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-34377 | 2 Zcashfoundation, Zfnd | 4 Zebra, Zebra-consensus, Zebra and 1 more | 2026-04-07 | 8.1 High |
| ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1. | ||||
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