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Search Results (7 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74578 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-18 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: algif_skcipher - force synchronous processing on trees without ctx->state The AIO/async path in skcipher_recvmsg() passes the socket-wide ctx->iv directly into the skcipher request. After io_submit() the socket lock is dropped and the request is processed asynchronously, so a concurrent sendmsg(ALG_SET_IV) can overwrite ctx->iv and make the in-flight request run under an attacker-controlled IV. For CTR/stream modes this is IV/keystream reuse and lets an unprivileged user recover the plaintext of a concurrent operation. Snapshotting ctx->iv into per-request storage for the async path is not sufficient. For ciphers with statesize == 0 - which includes cbc and ctr - the MSG_MORE inter-chunk IV chaining is carried solely by the in-place req->iv writeback, which a snapshot redirects into per-request memory that af_alg_free_resources() releases on completion, silently producing wrong output. Writing the IV back from the completion callback instead is not possible either: that would require lock_sock() there, but the callback can run in softirq/atomic context, so it must not sleep. Make the operation synchronous instead, which removes both the IV race and any writeback race. This is equivalent to the upstream resolution, commit fcc77d33a34c ("net: Remove support for AIO on sockets"), which removed the AIO socket path across net/ entirely and so produces the same end state for this file. This patch deviates from that commit deliberately: rather than removing AIO socket support tree-wide, which would be far too invasive for stable, it removes only the AIO branch in crypto/algif_skcipher.c. io_submit() now completes synchronously; AF_ALG async is rarely used in practice. The -EIOCBQUEUED check in skcipher_recvmsg() is now dead but harmless, and is left alone to keep the fix minimal. Tested on 6.6.y: attacker IV injection dropped from 2296/200000 to 0/200000 after the change; MSG_MORE chunked CTR output bit-identical to single-shot. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45445 | 1 Openssl | 1 Openssl | 2026-06-16 | 7.5 High |
| Issue summary: When an application drives an AES-OCB context through the public EVP_Cipher() one-shot interface, the application-supplied initialisation vector (IV) is silently discarded. Impact summary: Every message encrypted under the same key uses the same effective nonce regardless of the IV supplied by the caller, resulting in (key, nonce) reuse and loss of confidentiality. If the same code path is used to compute the authentication tag, the tag depends only on the (key, IV) pair and not on the plaintext or ciphertext, allowing universal forgery of arbitrary ciphertext from a single captured message. OpenSSL provides two ways to drive a cipher: the documented streaming interface (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) and a lower-level one-shot, EVP_Cipher(), whose documentation explicitly recommends against use by applications in favour of EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). The OCB provider's streaming handler flushes the application-supplied IV into the OCB context before processing data; the one-shot handler did not. Every call to EVP_Cipher() on an AES-OCB context therefore ran with the all-zero key-derived offset state left by cipher initialisation, regardless of the caller's IV. If EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() is subsequently used to obtain the authentication tag, the deferred IV setup runs at that point and clears the running checksum that should have been accumulated over the plaintext. The resulting tag is a function of (key, IV) only and verifies against any ciphertext produced under the same (key, IV) pair. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected: AES-OCB is not a TLS cipher suite, and libssl does not call EVP_Cipher() in any case. Applications that drive AES-OCB through the documented streaming AEAD API (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) are not affected. Only applications that combine the AES-OCB cipher with the EVP_Cipher() one-shot API are vulnerable. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as AES-OCB is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary. | ||||
| CVE-2026-25998 | 1 Strongswan | 1 Strongman | 2026-04-17 | 7.5 High |
| strongMan is a management interface for strongSwan, an OpenSource IPsec-based VPN. When storing credentials in the database (private keys, EAP secrets), strongMan encrypts the corresponding database fields. So far it used AES in CTR mode with a global database key. Together with an initialization vector (IV), a key stream is generated to encrypt the data in the database fields. But because strongMan did not generate individual IVs, every database field was encrypted using the same key stream. An attacker that has access to the database can use this to recover the encrypted credentials. In particular, because certificates, which have to be considered public information, are also encrypted using the same mechanism, an attacker can directly recover a large chunk of the key stream, which allows them to decrypt basically all other secrets especially ECDSA private keys and EAP secrets, which are usually a lot shorter. Version 0.2.0 fixes the issue by switching to AES-GCM-SIV encryption with a random nonce and an individually derived encryption key, using HKDF, for each encrypted value. Database migrations are provided to automatically re-encrypt all credentials. | ||||
| CVE-2025-0714 | 1 Mobatek | 1 Mobaxterm | 2026-04-15 | 6.5 Medium |
| The vulnerability exists in the password storage of Mobateks MobaXterm in versions below 25.0. MobaXTerm uses an initialisation vector (IV) consisting only of zero bytes and a master key to encrypt each password individually. In the default configuration, on opening MobaXTerm, the user is prompted for their password. A derivative of the password is used as the master key. As both the master key and the IV are the same for each stored password, the AES CFB ciphertext depends only on the plaintext (the password). The static IV and master key make it easier to obtain sensitive information and to decrypt data when it is stored at rest. | ||||
| CVE-2026-5087 | 1 Jjnapiork | 2 Pagi::middleware::session::store::cookie, Pagi\ | 2026-04-07 | 7.5 High |
| PAGI::Middleware::Session::Store::Cookie versions through 0.001003 for Perl generates random bytes insecurely. PAGI::Middleware::Session::Store::Cookie attempts to read bytes from the /dev/urandom device directly. If that fails (for example, on systems without the device, such as Windows), then it will emit a warning that recommends the user install Crypt::URandom, and then return a string of random bytes generated by the built-in rand function, which is unsuitable for cryptographic applications. This modules does not use the Crypt::URandom module, and installing it will not fix the problem. The random bytes are used for generating an initialisation vector (IV) to encrypt the cookie. A predictable IV may make it easier for malicious users to decrypt and tamper with the session data that is stored in the cookie. | ||||
| CVE-2022-26083 | 1 Intel | 1 Integrated Performance Primitives Cryptography | 2025-09-02 | 7.5 High |
| Generation of weak initialization vector in an Intel(R) IPP Cryptography software library before version 2021.5 may allow an unauthenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via local access. | ||||
| CVE-2023-2747 | 1 Silabs | 1 Gecko Software Development Kit | 2024-12-11 | 3.1 Low |
| The initialization vector (IV) used by the secure engine (SE) for encrypting data stored in the SE flash memory is uninitialized. | ||||
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