| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In 1.23.0 and earlier, a crafted image sequence with a 2x2 primary plane and a 256x256 auxiliary alpha plane can cause attacker-controlled heap corruption during a normal decode and re-encode workflow. Track_Visual::decode_next_image_sample() calls transfer_channel_from_image_as() without checking that the auxiliary alpha dimensions match the main frame. The resulting inconsistent image reaches heif_track_decode_next_image() and then heif_context_encode_image(). In unc_encoder::encode(), unc_encoder_component_interleave::encode_tile() sizes its buffer with compute_tile_data_size_bytes() using the primary dimensions but copies each component using its actual plane dimensions. The oversized alpha plane is therefore copied beyond the allocation, causing an out-of-bounds write; the inverse size mismatch can also produce an out-of-bounds read. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.1. |
| libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. From 1.19.0 until 1.23.1, a crafted uncompressed HEIF image using generic zlib unci full-item compression can crash an application that decodes an advertised tile with heif_image_handle_decode_image_tile(). In libheif/codecs/uncompressed/unc_decoder.cc, unc_decoder::fetch_tile_data() computes a large tile offset and unc_decoder::get_compressed_image_data_uncompressed() validates it with range_start_offset plus range_size. For the last advertised tile (4095, 4095), the addition can wrap to zero, bypass the bounds check, and pass an invalid source pointer and a one-terabyte length to memcpy. The observed result is an out-of-bounds read and process crash; opening the file alone does not trigger the issue because tile decoding is required. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.1. |
| Zephyr's Precision Time Protocol receive handler ptp_msg_post_recv() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/msg.c takes the 4-bit message type straight off the wire via ptp_msg_type() (msg->header.type_major_sdo_id & 0xF, range 0-15) and uses it to index the msg_size[] table. That table only defines entries up to PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT (0xD), giving it ARRAY_SIZE == 14. Before the fix there was no upper-bound check, so the undefined types 0xE and 0xF indexed one or two int slots past the end of the array — an out-of-bounds read of adjacent read-only data.
The out-of-bounds value is then reused as a length: it gates msg_size[type] > cnt, and when it is small or negative it makes cnt - msg_size[type] a large positive budget passed to msg_tlv_post_recv(), whose TLV loop then walks the message suffix past the received bytes, performing further out-of-bounds reads and in-place byte-swap writes on memory beyond the message slab.
The defect is reached directly from the network: ptp_port_event_gen() in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c reads a PTP frame with ptp_transport_recv() and calls ptp_msg_post_recv() with the attacker-chosen type. PTP uses UDP multicast or raw Ethernet (0x88F7) and is unauthenticated, so any host on the same link can trigger the indexing on a CONFIG_PTP-enabled node with no preconditions.
The reliably reproducible impact is a denial of service (fault/crash); a limited memory-corruption path exists but depends on the build-specific value adjacent to msg_size[], which the attacker cannot tune. The fix rejects type >= ARRAY_SIZE(msg_size) with -EBADMSG before any indexing. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or read kernel memory. |
| An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. |
| Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) is an open standard for machine learning interoperability. From 1.3.0 until 1.22.0, onnx.version_converter.convert_version() can perform an out-of-bounds read in Gemm_7_6::adapt_gemm_7_6() in onnx/version_converter/adapters/gemm_7_6.h when a Gemm node has input tensors with fewer than two dimensions because B_shape[1], A_shape[0], or A_shape[1] is accessed without a rank check, potentially causing a process crash during an opset 7 to 6 downgrade. This issue is fixed in version 1.22.0. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in the SOHM list-index deserialization code in HDF5 through 2.1.1 on all platforms allows attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted HDF5 file whose shared-message list index declares a num_messages count exceeding list_max, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads and writes in H5SM__cache_list_deserialize and H5SM__cache_list_verify_chksum. |
| Adaguc-server is an open source geographical information system to visualize, combine, compare and share real-time meteorological, climatological and remote sensing data via OGC standards. Versions prior to 7.2.2 crash with a memory-safety fault when it parses a GeoJSON document whose geometry contains a malformed coordinate. The coordinate parser in `adagucserverEC/CConvertGeoJSON.cpp` indexes `pt.u.array.values[0]` and `pt.u.array.values[1]` and uses `polygon.u.array.length` as a loop bound without first validating the JSON node type or the coordinate length. A coordinate that is an empty array, a one-element array, a scalar, or `null` leads to an out-of-bounds heap read or a NULL pointer dereference. The same unchecked pattern is present in four geometry branches: `Polygon`, `LineString`, `MultiLineString` and `MultiPolygon`. The vulnerable parser runs whenever the server processes a local GeoJSON file, either a configured GeoJSON dataset or a GeoJSON file exposed through the `AutoResource` feature and requested by an unauthenticated WMS request. A crafted GeoJSON file reliably crashes the backend process that handles that request. Version 7.2.2 patches the vulnerability. |
| A flaw was found in SSSD. The sss_nss_protocol_parse_addr() function in the NSS responder does not validate the addrlen field against the remaining packet body size. A local attacker can exploit this via a crafted GETHOSTBYADDR request to the NSS responder socket, causing an out-of-bounds read and process crash, resulting in a denial of service. |
| libmodplug through 0.8.9.1 contains an out-of-bounds read in pat_smplooped in src/load_pat.cpp. The function validates only the upper bound of its sample index against MAXSMP and then subtracts one before indexing the 191-byte static array pat_loops, so an index of zero reads pat_loops[-1], one byte before the array. The index is the smpno field of a parsed MIDI event, which is initialised to zero and only later overwritten from a program-change parameter, so an event reaching the note test before an instrument is assigned carries zero. A 32-byte MIDI file supplied to the library's public ModPlug_Load entry point drives the path through CSoundFile::Create, CSoundFile::ReadMID, and MID_ReadPatterns to the read. The byte read out of bounds determines whether a note event is treated as looping, so adjacent static storage influences playback state. |
| Deskflow is a keyboard and mouse sharing app. Prior to continuous build 1.26.0.299, a remote unauthenticated Deskflow server can send kMsgDSetOptions (DSOP) values to ServerProxy::setOptions() in src/lib/client/ServerProxy.cpp so that the value following a modifier option poisons m_modifierTranslationTable, after which ServerProxy::translateKey() or ServerProxy::translateModifierMask() indexes the seven-row s_translationTable or s_masks arrays out of bounds, disclosing four bytes at an attacker-selected relative offset or crashing the connected client; an odd option count also causes an out-of-bounds OptionsList read. This issue is fixed in continuous build 1.26.0.299. |
| Deskflow is a keyboard and mouse sharing app. From 1.17.0 until continuous build 1.26.0.296, a malicious Deskflow server can send an odd-length DSOP vector to ServerProxy::setOptions() in src/lib/client/ServerProxy.cpp, causing the missing value after the final option key to be read beyond the vector during the PacketStreamFilter::filterEvent to ServerProxy::handleData() to ServerProxy::parseHandshakeMessage() call chain and crash the connected client. This issue is fixed in continuous build 1.26.0.296. |
| A missing bounds check in the BSON CodeWScope element accessors allows an attacker to trigger an out-of-bounds heap read via a crafted aggregation pipeline. The vulnerability can be exploited by an authenticated user by generating a malformed BSONColumn data containing a CodeWScope element, bypassing wire-level BSON validation. When the forged element is decompressed, the unchecked size value is used in pointer arithmetic, causing either a server crash or disclosure of adjacent heap memory contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: TDX: Reject concurrent change to CPUID entry count
Reject KVM_TDX_INIT_VM if userspace changes cpuid.nent between the
initial read and the subsequent copy of the initialization data.
tdx_td_init() first reads user_data->cpuid.nent to size the flexible
kvm_tdx_init_vm copy. The copied structure also contains cpuid.nent,
and that field can differ from the value used to size the allocation if
userspace modifies the input concurrently. setup_tdparams_cpuids() later
passes init_vm->cpuid.nent to kvm_find_cpuid_entry2(), which uses it as
the array bound for the copied entries.
Require the copied count to match the value used to size the allocation
so that CPUID parsing cannot access beyond the entries actually copied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: topology: validate vendor array size before parsing
sof_parse_token_sets() reads array->size while iterating over topology
private data. The loop condition only checks that some data remains, so a
malformed topology with a truncated trailing vendor array can make the
parser read the size field before a full vendor-array header is available.
Validate that the remaining private data contains a complete
snd_soc_tplg_vendor_array header before reading array->size.
The declared array size check also needs to remain signed. asize is an int,
but sizeof(*array) has type size_t, so comparing them directly promotes
negative asize values to unsigned and lets them pass the check,
as reported in the stable review thread reference below.
Cast sizeof(*array) to int when validating the declared array size. This
rejects negative, zero and otherwise too-small sizes before the parser
dispatches to the tuple-specific code. |
| An out-of-bounds read issue in the Base64 decoder in Amazon aws-sdk-cpp before 1.11.862, on some platforms, might allow a remote authenticated user to crash an application that processes crafted Base64-encoded input.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.11.862. |
| A flaw was found in BlueZ. Insufficient validation of packet length fields in GetFolderItems responses within the Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVRCP) implementation allows a malicious Bluetooth device within range to cause an out-of-bounds memory read. This vulnerability, affecting the parse_media_element() and parse_media_folder() functions, can lead to a crash of the bluetoothd daemon, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). It could also potentially expose sensitive heap memory contents. Exploitation requires user interaction to pair with the malicious device. |
| A Zabbix administrator is able to read out of bounds memory by utilizing a flaw in script item/preprocessing (JavaScript) HttpRequest logic, leading to potential confidentiality loss. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds
rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw
length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/diag: Add missing array_index_nospec() call to memtop_get_page_count()
'level' is user space controlled and used to read from an array. Add the
missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative execution. |
