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Search Results (401112 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98012 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum in change path sfq_change() accepts any non-negative quantum (only rejects (int)ctl->quantum < 0). With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service). Add max(256U, ...) matching fq_codel_change(). Reject quantum > 1<<20 with -EINVAL, matching fq_codel_change() and the init clamp. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_SFQ=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root sfq tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root sfq quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-98011 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths hhf_change() accepts any quantum from userspace, including 1. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 makes the deficit-refill loop spin ~2^31 times under the qdisc lock (a soft lockup / denial of service). Add max(256U, ...) in hhf_change() matching fq_codel_change(). Clamp hhf_init() to [256, 1<<20] matching the siblings, and remove the old fallback that only set quantum=256 on overflow. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_HHF=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root hhf tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root hhf quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-98010 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: drr: clamp quantum in change class drr_change_class() rejects explicit quantum==0 but falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so quantum=1 (or a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device) makes the deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock. Add clamp_t(u32, quantum, 256, 1<<20) after the zero reject and on the fallback path. The explicit-zero reject is preserved. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root drr tc class add dev dummy0 parent 1: classid 1:1 drr quantum 1 | ||||
| CVE-2026-98009 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: ets: clamp quantum in parse and fallback paths ets_qdisc_change() falls back to psched_mtu() with no floor for bands without an explicit quantum. With a crafted size table qdisc_pkt_len reaches ~2 GiB, so a zero psched_mtu on a headerless device makes the deficit-refill loop spin under the qdisc lock. Move the floor into ets_quantum_parse() so explicitly configured quanta are also clamped to [256, 1<<20], not just the fallback path. Conditions to recreate the bug: CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices). tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root ets bands 3 strict 2 quanta 1 1 | ||||
| CVE-2026-98008 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: macb: fix NULL pointer dereference on unbind with fixed-link When the device tree describes a fixed-link and has no "mdio" child node, macb_mii_init() returns early without allocating the MDIO bus, leaving bp->mii_bus as NULL. Two cleanup paths then dereference this NULL bus: 1. On driver unbind, macb_remove() unconditionally calls mdiobus_unregister(bp->mii_bus), which oopses: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000004a8 pc : mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4 lr : macb_remove+0x38/0xa4 Call trace: mdiobus_unregister+0x14/0xa4 (P) macb_remove+0x38/0xa4 platform_remove+0x20/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x224 unbind_store+0xb4/0xbc 2. On the probe error path in macb_probe(), reached when macb_mii_init() has succeeded but a subsequent step fails, the err_out_unregister_mdio label runs the same unconditional cleanup. mdiobus_unregister() and mdiobus_free() do not guard against a NULL bus, so guard the calls in both macb_remove() and the probe error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98007 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject non-scalar bpf_loop iteration counts bpf_loop() declares its nr_loops argument as ARG_ANYTHING. Privileged programs may pass pointer values to such arguments, so check_func_arg() lets a pointer-valued R1 reach the helper-specific checks. Since commit bb124da69c47 ("bpf: keep track of max number of bpf_loop callback iterations"), the verifier marks R1 precise and reads its upper bound to limit callback simulation. Precision backtracking only accepts scalar registers, so passing a pointer instead triggers the "backtracking misuse" verifier warning. Kernels with panic_on_warn enabled subsequently panic. Introduce ARG_SCALAR for helper arguments that only accept scalar values and use it for bpf_loop() nr_loops. Generic helper argument validation then rejects pointers before loop inlining and precision processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98006 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: Decoupling ep1_in_urb in caiaq dev The epq_in_urb object belonging to the caiaq device is coupled within the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev. After usb_submit_urb(epq_in_urb, GFP_KERNEL) executes successfully, epq_in_urb is successfully added to the urbp_list queue of the dummy HCD driver (userspace specifies dummy_hcd as the HCD layer driver for the caiaq USB device). When init_card() calls snd_usb_caiaq_send_command() which subsequently fails due to a timeout, and proceeds to call snd_card_free() to release the card, the embedded ep1_in_urb object is also freed. When the dummy HCD driver detects that the URB has been unlinked, it returns the URB (by usb_hcd_giveback_urb()), which triggers [1]. Decouple the ep1_in_urb object from the struct snd_usb_caiaqdev and switch to using a pointer instead. Separately allocate and manage the memory for ep1_in_urb to prevent the release of the snd_card memory object from interfering with it. midi_out_urb has the same issue as ep1_in_urb and is handled in the same way. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88803cee1050 by task ktimers/1/29 Call Trace: usb_free_urb+0x24/0x120 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:96 dummy_timer+0xaac/0x4d50 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:2019 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2067 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x3eb/0xaf0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2124 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x1e1/0x2e0 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2141 Allocated by task 36: snd_card_new+0x7b/0x110 sound/core/init.c:184 create_card sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:429 [inline] snd_probe+0x236/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:544 Freed by task 36: snd_card_free_when_closed sound/core/init.c:630 [inline] snd_card_free+0x138/0x1d0 sound/core/init.c:662 snd_probe+0x162b/0x1af0 sound/usb/caiaq/device.c:553 | ||||
| CVE-2026-97998 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nfnetlink_log: cope with concurrent instance destruction Instances are refcounted. However, only memory release happens on the 1 -> 0 transition; the unlink from hashes can occur with any refcount. Uncooperative userspace can force a situation where a queue is pending for destruction from netlink event while a different socket with same portid processes an UNBIND request. With right timing, this will unhash the instance again: Oops: general protection fault, [..] Call Trace: <TASK> nfulnl_recv_config+0x31a/0xd50 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7c2/0xeb0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-97995 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_console: do not free control-out buffers on remove __send_control_msg() publishes &portdev->cpkt as the control-out virtqueue cookie. remove_vqs() walks every virtqueue and passes leftover cookies to free_buf(), which treats them as struct port_buffer and reads sgpages. If a control message is still on c_ovq when the device is unbound, free_buf() reads past the ports_device object. KASAN reported slab-out-of-bounds in free_buf(): free_buf remove_vqs virtcons_remove unbind_store The object was the ports_device allocated in virtcons_probe(). Drain c_ovq without freeing. The packet lives in portdev and is released with it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/vdpa: reject VRING_NUM larger than device max vhost_vring_set_num() accepts any non-zero power-of-two queue size that fits in 16 bits. vhost-vdpa then passes that value to set_vq_num() without comparing it with get_vq_num_max(). A process with access to /dev/vhost-vdpa-* can therefore configure a queue larger than the device advertises. With vdpa_sim, the worker can walk descriptors beyond the mapped descriptor ring. KASAN reports a 16-byte out-of-bounds read, corresponding to one vring_desc, in the vringh IOTLB path: BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter Read of size 16 copy_from_iotlb copydesc_iotlb vringh_getdesc_iotlb vdpasim_net_work Cache get_vq_num_max() immediately after reset. Some backends derive it from writable queue-size state, so querying it after SET_NUM may return the current size instead of the device capability. Invalidate the cached value before reset so a failed reset leaves SET_NUM disabled. For VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM, copy the complete vring state once and use the same index and size for validation, vq->num, and set_vq_num(). This ensures that validation and use operate on the same copied values. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97993 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost-vdpa: don't install the eventfd_ctx_fdget() error in config_ctx vhost_vdpa_set_config_call() swaps the eventfd_ctx_fdget() return value into v->config_ctx before checking it, so on failure the field briefly holds an ERR_PTR: ctx = fd == VHOST_FILE_UNBIND ? NULL : eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd); swap(ctx, v->config_ctx); if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ctx)) eventfd_ctx_put(ctx); if (IS_ERR(v->config_ctx)) { long ret = PTR_ERR(v->config_ctx); v->config_ctx = NULL; return ret; } Commit 0bde59c1723a ("vhost-vdpa: set v->config_ctx to NULL if eventfd_ctx_fdget() fails") added that clearing, and spelled out the invariant the rest of the file relies on: "we consider 'v->config_ctx' valid if it is not NULL". The window between the swap and the clearing still breaks it. vhost_vdpa_config_cb() only tests for NULL, so a config interrupt delivered inside the window hands the ERR_PTR to eventfd_signal(). Check the fd before installing it instead. That closes the window and matches how vhost_vring_ioctl() handles the same failure for the vq call fd. It also stops a rejected fd from tearing down a config interrupt that was working: until now the swap replaced the live context and put it, so after an EBADF the device silently stopped delivering config interrupts until userspace installed a new fd. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97991 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vdpa_sim_blk: reject out-of-range sector starts vdpasim_blk_check_range() logs an invalid start sector but continues validating the request. The subsequent unsigned capacity subtraction can underflow and let an out-of-range buffer offset reach the data path. The invalid offset is used by three request paths. VIRTIO_BLK_T_OUT copies guest data to blk->buffer + offset through vringh_iov_pull_iotlb(), causing an out-of-bounds write in _copy_from_iter() or memcpy(). VIRTIO_BLK_T_IN copies from blk->buffer + offset to the guest through vringh_iov_push_iotlb(), causing an out-of-bounds read in _copy_to_iter(). VIRTIO_BLK_T_WRITE_ZEROES passes blk->buffer + offset to memset(), causing an out-of-bounds write. Reject starts at or beyond the capacity before the subtraction. Treat the capacity boundary as invalid because the IN and OUT paths round byte counts down to sectors for validation but later copy the original byte counts. A sub-sector request at the capacity boundary would otherwise still access past the end of the buffer. I found this bug myself, though the patch was written with AI assistance. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97990 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vdpa_sim_net: check TX pull result before RX copy vringh_iov_pull_iotlb() returns a signed byte count. A failed TX pull is currently added to the unsigned byte counter and then passed as a size_t length to receive_filter() and vringh_iov_push_iotlb(). A negative error can therefore become a large length in the RX path. Handle non-positive pull results before every length use. Count the TX error and complete the consumed TX descriptor with zero bytes. I found this bug myself, though the patch was written with AI assistance. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_input: reset device if input_register_device() fails Probe marks the device DRIVER_OK with virtio_device_ready() before calling input_register_device(). If registration fails, the error path cleared vi->ready and called del_vqs() while the device was still live, so the device could keep DMA to queues that were already torn down. Match remove/freeze: call virtio_reset_device() on that path before tearing down the virtqueues. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97986 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_input: stop callbacks before unregistering input device virtinput_remove() unregisters the input device before resetting the virtio device. virtinput_recv_events() drops vi->lock around input_event(), so clearing vi->ready does not stop a callback that passed the entry check. It can still use vi->idev, requeue buffers and kick the queue. Reset first, as virtinput_freeze() already does. With the preceding core change, reset waits for callbacks before input_unregister_device() can free vi->idev. Recheck vi->ready after taking the lock again: keep draining completed events so an input packet is not truncated, but stop requeueing buffers and kicking the queue. With evdev attached, input_unregister_handle() currently waits for an RCU grace period, which also waits out IRQ callbacks. This masks the lifetime bug on PCI and MMIO, but does not protect sleepable callbacks on other transports. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97984 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU. Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest): 1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork. 2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU. 3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that). 4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short. To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit the change to UDP sockets only. The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later, and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-97982 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: cortina: Fix budget accounting The gmac_rx() function returns the remaining NAPI budget, but its caller treats the return value as the number of packets received. An idle poll therefore reports a full budget and remains scheduled. Return the number of received packets instead. Preserve the existing free queue refill accounting by adding that count directly; continuing to subtract it from the budget would invert the refill behavior. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97981 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: cortina: Count dropped frames as NAPI work The RX loop only consumes budget when it successfully delivers a frame. Error paths keep consuming descriptors without reducing the budget, so a stream of bad frames can process the entire receive ring in one poll. Move the budget accounting to a common end-of-frame path. This counts each completed frame as NAPI work whether it was delivered or dropped, matching the behavior of the vendor driver. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: add missing xa_destroy for sched_node_ids Commit 16dfa49406bc ("ice: Introduce new parameters in ice_sched_node") added a sched_node_ids xarray to the port info structure, but never called xa_destroy on it. Since xarrays can allocate internal memory, this can result in a memory leak even if every element in the xarray has been removed. The xarray is currently embedded in the port_info structure. This appears to have been done because its use is within functions that take the port_info as a primary argument. However, this complicates managing the lifecycle of the field. The port_info structure is allocated in ice_init_hw() using devm, and it is not released until the devm cleanup when the driver is unloaded. The ice_init_hw() function is called in many places, including devlink reload, and possibly during DDP load after updating the Tx scheduler layout. Adding a call of xa_destroy to the ice_deinit_hw() causes Sashiko to raise multiple concerns due to potential ordering issues and possible ways that port_info could be a dangling reference. To handle this, move the sched_node_ids out of port_info and into the hw structure. All users of the array already have a pointer to hw anyways, and there is only one sched_node_ids per adapter. While here, remove the overly verbose comment explaining the nature of the sched_node_ids xarray. Add the missing xa_destroy to the cleanup path and to ice_deinit_hw(), ensuring that we properly release the xarray memory. This was caught by Sashiko during development of unrelated code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-97977 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: Fix UAF of btusb_data by rx_work btusb_close() and btusb_flush() cancel data->rx_work with the asynchronous cancel_delayed_work(), so if btusb_rx_work() is already running on another CPU it keeps running after the cancel returns. btusb_disconnect() calls hci_unregister_dev(), which invokes btusb_close(), and then frees the btusb_data. A still running btusb_rx_work() then dereferences the freed data: while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&data->acl_q))) data->recv_acl(data->hdev, skb); Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead. In btusb_close() the cancel also has to happen after btusb_stop_traffic(), otherwise an URB completion racing with the cancel can requeue the work right after it has been waited for. | ||||