Export limit exceeded: 22604 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 381903 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 22604 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (22604 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74388 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: oss: Fix UAF at handling events with embedded SysEx data The OSS sequencer processes the input MIDI bytes into a sequencer event to be dispatched later (in snd_seq_oss_midi_putc() called from snd_seq_oss_process_event()). When it's a SysEx data, the event record contains data.ext.ptr pointer to the original SysEx bytes, and the referred data is copied into the pool afterwards at dispatching. The problem is that, if the sequencer port gets closed concurrently before the dispatch, the OSS sequencer core also releases the resources (in snd_seq_oss_midi_check_exit_port()), while the pending event may hold a stale pointer, eventually leading to a UAF at a later dispatch. Fortunately, there is already a refcounting mechanism (snd_use_lock_t) for the OSS MIDI device access, and for addressing the issue above, we just need to extend the refcount until the event gets dispatched. This patch extends snd_seq_oss_process_event() to give back the refcount object, which is in turn released after calling the sequencer dispatcher with the given event in the caller side. According to the original report, KASAN report as below: KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_seq_event_dup+0x40c/0x470 RIP: 0033:0x7f2cb66a6340 Read of size 6 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?) print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?) kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?) kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?) snd_seq_event_dup+0x40c/0x470 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x10c/0x1c0 (?:?) __asan_memcpy+0x27/0x70 (?:?) snd_seq_event_dup+0x9/0x470 (?:?) snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x139/0x240 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x60 (?:?) snd_seq_kernel_client_enqueue+0x102/0x120 (?:?) snd_seq_oss_write+0x416/0x4e0 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?) odev_write+0x3b/0x60 (?:?) vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?) __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?) __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x129/0x510 (?:?) ksys_write+0xe1/0x180 (?:?) mutex_unlock+0x16/0x20 (?:?) odev_ioctl+0x65/0xc0 (?:?) __x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?) x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) | ||||
| CVE-2026-74404 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Fix snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() off-by-one Sashiko notes: > regarding the bounds check in snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions() > called via walk_iomem_res_desc(): does the check > if ((range_list->num_elements * 16 + 8) > PAGE_SIZE) > allow an off-by-one heap buffer overflow? > > If range_list->num_elements is 255, 255 * 16 + 8 = 4088, which is <= 4096. > Writing range->base (8 bytes) fills 4088-4095, but writing range->page_count > (4 bytes) would write to 4096-4099, overflowing the kzalloc-allocated > PAGE_SIZE buffer. Fix this by accounting for the entry about to be written to, in addition to the entries that are already allocated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74527 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state PF and VF NIX LFs that share a CGX LMAC reuse the same hardware PKIND programming. When HiGig2 or EDSA parsing is enabled, a VF NIX LF alloc must not reset the LMAC RX PKIND or default TX parse config over the PF setup. Add cgx_get_pkind() and rvu_cgx_is_pkind_config_permitted() so VFs skip cgx_set_pkind(), rvu_npc_set_pkind(), and NIX_AF_LFX_TX_PARSE_CFG updates when the LMAC is using NPC_RX_HIGIG_PKIND or NPC_RX_EDSA_PKIND. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74474 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() for transmit path header pulls In vxlan_xmit(), arp_reduce(), and vxlan_mdb_entry_skb_get(), pskb_may_pull() was being called to verify the availability of network layer headers (ARP, IPv6/ND, IP/IPv6 MDB keys). However, during transmit skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, len) only checks len bytes from skb->data rather than skb_network_offset(skb) + len, which can leave part of the network header in non-linear frags. Replace these remaining pskb_may_pull() calls with pskb_network_may_pull() to properly account for the MAC header offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74479 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: pktgen: fix proc entry use-after-free pktgen_change_name() replaces pkt_dev->entry while holding t->if_lock. pktgen_remove_device() removes the same entry before _rem_dev_from_if_list() takes that lock. This allows the following interleaving: CPU 0 (NETDEV_CHANGENAME) CPU 1 (kpktgend) if_lock(t) proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry) proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry) pkt_dev->entry = proc_create_data(...) if_unlock(t) The kthread can pass the stale proc_dir_entry to proc_remove() after the rename path has freed it. A reproducer with a widened race window reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_remove+0x78/0x80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881478fea70 by task kpktgend_0/67 Call Trace: proc_remove+0x78/0x80 pktgen_remove_device.isra.0+0x11c/0x4c0 pktgen_thread_worker+0x1214/0x6bc0 kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 Allocated by task 95: __proc_create+0x204/0x790 proc_create_data+0x72/0xe0 pktgen_thread_write+0xd61/0x1510 Freed by task 28: kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0 proc_free_inode+0x5b/0x80 rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881478fea00 which belongs to the cache proc_dir_entry of size 192 Move proc_remove() into the if_lock-protected list removal helper. Keep it before list_del_rcu() to preserve the ordering required by add_device(). The rename path must then finish replacing the entry before removal, or it observes that the device is no longer on the list. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74476 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: convert frag_list skbs before running XDP A frag_list skb can reach veth with data_len set but nr_frags zero. veth_convert_skb_to_xdp_buff() only converts skbs that are shared, locked, have frags[], or do not have enough headroom. It later uses skb_is_nonlinear() to decide whether to set XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS and xdp_frags_size. That exposes frag_list data to XDP as if it were stored in frags[], but frags[] is empty. AF_XDP copy mode can then trust the bogus XDP fragment metadata, walk an empty fragment entry, and crash in memcpy() from __xsk_rcv(). Route non-linear skbs through skb_pp_cow_data() before exposing them to XDP, and only advertise XDP frags when the resulting skb has frags[]. skb_copy_bits() already handles frag_list input, and skb_pp_cow_data() builds frags[] output with skb_add_rx_frag(), which is the representation XDP multi-buffer expects. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74429 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix the reception of a reply packet before data transmission Fix rxrpc_receiving_reply() to handle the reception of an apparent reply DATA packet before rxrpc has had a chance to send any request DATA packets on a client call by checking to see if the call has been exposed yet by sending the first packet. Without this, rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() might oops. Also fix rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() to handle the Tx queue being empty by changing the do...while loop into a while loop, just in case a call is abnormally terminated by an early reply before the last request packet is transmitted. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74430 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means: (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may still happen). The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the first packet is transmitted. RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the reply to be received. (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong state. Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this. (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition. Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL packet[1]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62899 | 3 Apple, Linux, Microsoft | 8 Macos, Linux Kernel, .net and 5 more | 2026-08-17 | 5.9 Medium |
| Inconsistent interpretation of http requests ('http request/response smuggling') in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62901 | 3 Apple, Linux, Microsoft | 8 Macos, Linux Kernel, .net and 5 more | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| Unchecked input for loop condition in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62909 | 3 Apple, Linux, Microsoft | 8 Macos, Linux Kernel, .net and 5 more | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| Uncaught exception in .NET allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74439 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down scalable-mode context entry device_pasid_table_teardown() zeroes the 128-bit scalable-mode context entry with context_clear_entry() while the Present bit is still set. This creates a window where the hardware can fetch a torn entry, with some fields already zeroed while Present is still set, leading to unpredictable behavior or spurious faults. The context-cache invalidation is issued only after the entry has been zeroed, and intel_pasid_free_table() then frees the PASID directory pages, so the IOMMU can keep walking a stale Present=1 entry that points at freed memory. While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder the two 64-bit writes to the entry, and the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be atomic with respect to multiple CPU writes. Commit c1e4f1dccbe9d ("iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down context entry") fixed this exact pattern in domain_context_clear_one() and the copied-context path, but device_pasid_table_teardown() was not converted. Align it with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec, Section 6.5.3.3, using the same ownership handshake as the sibling fix: clear only the Present bit, flush it to the IOMMU, perform the context-cache invalidation, and only then zero the rest of the entry. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74367 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix inconsistent arvif state in vdev_create error paths ath12k_mac_vdev_create() has three error path issues that leave arvif in an inconsistent state: 1. When ath12k_wmi_vdev_create() fails, the function returns directly without clearing arvif->ar, which was already set before the WMI call. Subsequent code checking arvif->ar to determine vdev readiness will see a non-NULL value despite no vdev existing in firmware. 2. When ath12k_wmi_send_peer_delete_cmd() fails in err_peer_del, the code jumped to err: skipping the DP peer cleanup and vdev rollback, leaving num_created_vdevs, vdev maps and arvif list membership live. 3. When ath12k_wait_for_peer_delete_done() fails, the code jumped to err_vdev_del: skipping the DP peer cleanup. Fix by changing the ath12k_wmi_vdev_create() failure to goto err instead of returning directly, routing both err_peer_del failure paths through err_dp_peer_del: for proper DP peer and vdev rollback, and consolidating the arvif state cleanup at err:. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c5-00302-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-1.115823.3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-74396 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx5: Fix UMR XLT cleanup on ODP populate failure mlx5r_umr_update_xlt() allocates and DMA maps an XLT buffer with mlx5r_umr_create_xlt(). The buffer is released by the common cleanup path through mlx5r_umr_unmap_free_xlt(). After mlx5_odp_populate_xlt() became fallible, its error path returned directly and skipped that cleanup. This leaks the XLT DMA mapping and buffer. If the emergency XLT page was used, it also leaves xlt_emergency_page_mutex locked. Break out of the loop so execution falls through the existing cleanup path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74310 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/net: complete zerocopy ubufs only once vhost-net initializes one ubuf_info per outstanding zerocopy TX descriptor and hands it to the backend socket. The networking stack may then clone a zerocopy skb before all skb references are released. For example, batman-adv fragmentation reaches skb_split(), which calls skb_zerocopy_clone() and increments the same ubuf_info refcount. vhost_zerocopy_complete() currently treats every ubuf callback as a completed vhost descriptor. It dereferences ubuf->ctx, writes the descriptor completion state, and drops the vhost_net_ubuf_ref even when the callback only releases a cloned skb reference. A backend reset can therefore wait for and free the vhost_net_ubuf_ref while another cloned skb still carries the same ubuf_info. A later completion then dereferences the freed ubufs pointer. KASAN reports the stale completion as: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x1d7/0x1f0 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vhost_zerocopy_complete+0x101/0x1f0 vhost_zerocopy_complete skb_copy_ubufs __dev_forward_skb2 veth_xmit The freed object was allocated from vhost_net_ioctl() while setting the backend and freed through kfree_rcu()/kvfree_rcu_bulk after backend removal, while delayed skb completion still reached vhost_zerocopy_complete(). Honor the generic ubuf_info refcount before touching vhost state, and run the vhost descriptor completion only for the final ubuf reference. This matches the msg_zerocopy_complete() ownership rule for cloned zerocopy skbs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74330 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: configfs: fix lockless traversals of ->s_children Having the parent directory locked protects entries from removal by another thread, but it does *not* protect cursors from being moved around by lseek() - or freed, for that matter. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72310 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix overflow in passthrough ioctl bounds check smb2_ioctl_query_info() validates the PASSTHRU_FSCTL response payload before copying it to userspace. The payload offset and length both come from 32-bit fields. The bounds check currently adds OutputOffset and qi.input_buffer_length directly, so the addition can wrap in 32-bit arithmetic before the result is compared against the response buffer length. A malicious server can use a large OutputOffset and a small OutputCount to make the wrapped sum pass the bounds check. The later copy_to_user() then reads from io_rsp + OutputOffset, outside the response buffer. Use size_add() for the offset plus length check so overflow is treated as out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72492 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in same_client_has_lease() same_client_has_lease() returns an opinfo pointer from ci->m_op_list after dropping ci->m_lock without taking a reference. smb_grant_oplock() then dereferences that pointer in copy_lease() and when checking breaking_cnt. A concurrent close can remove the old lease from ci->m_op_list and drop the last reference before the caller uses the returned pointer, leading to a use-after-free. Take a reference when same_client_has_lease() selects an existing lease, drop any previous match while scanning, and release the returned reference in smb_grant_oplock() after copying the lease state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74259 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: remove all cifs files before kill super Cifs files may be put into fileinfo_put_wq during umounting cifs. After umount done, cifsFileInfo_put_final is called, which cause following BUG: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 ... [ 134.222152] list_lru_add+0x64/0x1a0 [ 134.222399] ? cifs_put_tcon+0x171/0x340 [cifs] [ 134.222772] d_lru_add+0x44/0x60 [ 134.222997] dput+0x1fc/0x210 [ 134.223213] cifsFileInfo_put_final+0x11a/0x140 [cifs] [ 134.223576] process_one_work+0x17c/0x320 [ 134.223843] worker_thread+0x188/0x280 [ 134.224084] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 134.224366] kthread+0xcc/0x100 [ 134.224576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 134.224827] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 134.225063] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 134.225328] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 This can be reproduce by following: unshare -n bash -c " mkdir -p ${CIFS_MNT} ip netns attach root 1 ip link add eth0 type veth peer veth0 netns root ip link set eth0 up ip -n root link set veth0 up ip addr add 192.168.0.2/24 dev eth0 ip -n root addr add 192.168.0.1/24 dev veth0 ip route add default via 192.168.0.1 dev eth0 ip netns exec root sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE mount -t cifs ${CIFS_PATH} ${CIFS_MNT} -o vers=3.0,sec=ntlmssp,credentials=${CIFS_CRED},rsize=65536,wsize=65536,cache=none,echo_interval=1 touch ${CIFS_MNT}/a.txt ip netns exec root iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.2 -o ${DEV} -j MASQUERADE " umount ${CIFS_MNT} | ||||
| CVE-2026-72462 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-17 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix race in unix socket mediation when peer_path is used The holding a reference to the peer_sk is not enough to ensure access to the peer sk path. Accessing the path outside of the state lock allows for a race with unix_release_sock(). Fix this by taking the state lock and getting a reference to the path under lock. Ideally for connected sockets we would cache this information so we don't have to take the lock here. But for now just fix the race. | ||||