| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.6, Vvveb's SSRF guard resolves a host with an IPv4-only function and never inspects IPv6, so any host that lacks an A record passes a private-range check. Editor oEmbed proxy fetches an attacker-supplied URL server side and reflects a response body, so an authenticated admin-panel user (default role site_admin or higher) can read internal-only services and cloud metadata, including IAM credentials, using an IPv6 literal or a domain that carries only an AAAA record. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.8.6. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.6, Vvveb's HTML sanitizer fails to strip event-handler attributes when a tag carries a greater-than character inside a quoted attribute value. A low-privilege content author (default role author or contributor) can store a payload in post or product content that runs JavaScript in a browser of every visitor and of any administrator who views or previews that content, which opens a path to admin account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.8.6. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.6, a flawed central path sanitizer lets an authenticated admin-panel user who holds backup access (default role site_admin or higher) read and delete arbitrary files on a server. An attacker can recover database credentials from config/db.php, read host files such as /etc/passwd, and delete config/db.php to push a site back into install mode for a full takeover. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.8.6. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, app/controller/user/profile.php accepts the user[bio] field and passes stored content through sanitizeHTML() in system/functions.php, whose on* event-handler regular expression omits the forward-slash delimiter and whose do-while condition compares the string to itself, so forbidden nested tags are removed only once. An Author-role or higher user can submit solidus-prefixed event-handler markup or nested forbidden tags that survive sanitization. The stored bio is rendered without sufficient output encoding on /author/{username}, in the admin user-management view, and potentially in comment displays, causing attacker-controlled JavaScript to execute when unauthenticated visitors, administrators, or other users view the content. This can expose browser-session data and permit victim-context account actions, defacement, or phishing. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, getThemeFolder() in admin/controller/editor/revisions.php returns the attacker-controlled theme parameter without sanitization, and backupFolder() concatenates it beneath DIR_THEMES before editor/revisions/load or editor/revisions/delete operates on a named .html file. sanitizeBackupFileName() strips traversal characters only from the separate file parameter and does not protect the theme directory component. An authenticated user with the default Editor role and editor/* permission can submit traversal sequences that redirect file_get_contents() or unlink() to a reachable backup subdirectory outside the web root. A valid admin session and CSRF token are required, the read is limited to .html files in backup directories, and deletion additionally requires filesystem write permission. This can disclose sensitive exported site content or remove backup data. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.5, the oEmbedProxy() handler in admin/controller/editor/editor.php accepts an attacker-controlled url parameter and passes it to getUrl(), while validateUrl() in system/functions.php checks only the hostname string and does not validate its resolved addresses. An authenticated admin-panel user with editor/* permission can invoke GET /admin/index.php?module=editor/editor&action=oEmbedProxy with a dotted hostname or normalized loopback form that resolves to a private, loopback, link-local, or reserved address, causing the server to issue an HTTP or HTTPS request and return the response body. Storefront users and anonymous visitors cannot invoke the endpoint, but no CSRF token is required because the action uses GET. This can disclose internal service responses or cloud instance metadata and associated credentials. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. From 1.0.0 until 1.0.8.5, saveGlobalElements() in admin/controller/editor/global-trait.php concatenates the attacker-controlled file portion of data-v-save-global to the active theme directory before loadHTMLFile() and file_put_contents() operate on it. An authenticated user with the default Editor role and editor/* permission can submit crafted HTML to module=editor/editor&action=save and traverse to an existing writable PHP file outside the theme directory. If the target is web-accessible, editor-controlled PHP content executes in the web server context; a shipped public/vadmin/index.php entrypoint can be used as an execution trampoline rather than requiring a test-only file. This can permit persistent webshell placement and compromise application confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.5. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend post operations allow a low-privileged Author to access posts owned by another Author. The admin/controller/content/posts.php controller permits filter[admin_id] to replace the server-selected admin_id restriction and accepts a caller-controlled post_id for duplicate and delete actions, while admin/sql/sqlite/post.sql does not consistently enforce post.admin_id. An attacker can view post metadata, discover post identifiers, duplicate posts, or delete posts and related content, exposing private drafts and causing content pollution, data loss, or business disruption. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend post revision operations allow a low-privileged Author to access revisions for posts owned by another Author. The admin/controller/content/revisions.php controller and admin/sql/sqlite/post_content_revision.sql queries trust caller-controlled post_id, language_id, and created_at values without consistently applying the current admin_id to revision lists, reads, restores, and deletes. An attacker can read historic post content, restore a revision over another Author's live post content, or delete revision records, exposing drafts, corrupting published content, and removing audit history. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend product review operations allow a low-privileged Vendor to manage reviews under another Vendor's products. The admin/sql/sqlite/product_review.sql queries accept a caller-controlled product_review_id and do not verify product_review.product_id against product.admin_id for the current admin_id. An attacker can read pending review content, ratings, author information, and moderation state, change review status, edit review content, or delete reviews, manipulating product review visibility and integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend digital asset operations allow a low-privileged Vendor to access digital assets linked to another Vendor's products. The admin/controller/product/digital-asset.php and admin/controller/product/digital-assets.php controllers and the admin/sql/sqlite/digital_asset.sql data queries use a caller-controlled digital_asset_id without consistently enforcing the current admin_id ownership boundary. An attacker can list assets, read asset names and file metadata, edit asset metadata, or delete asset records, which can disclose private product metadata, corrupt resource links, and cause data loss. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend product revision operations allow a low-privileged Vendor to access revisions for products owned by another Vendor. The admin/controller/product/revisions.php route reuses admin/controller/content/revisions.php, while admin/sql/sqlite/product_content_revision.sql trusts caller-controlled product_id, language_id, and created_at values without applying the current admin_id to revision reads, restores, and deletes. An attacker can read historic product content, restore a revision over another Vendor's live product content, or delete revision records, exposing private copy, corrupting product pages, and removing audit history. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend product operations allow a low-privileged Vendor to access products owned by another Vendor. The admin/controller/product/products.php controller accepts a caller-controlled product_id for duplicate and delete actions, and admin/sql/sqlite/product.sql loads and mutates products without consistently applying the current admin_id when view_other_products or edit_other_products is absent. An attacker can read product details, duplicate products, or delete products and related catalog data, exposing commercial information and causing unauthorized copies, catalog pollution, data loss, or business disruption. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend comment operations allow a low-privileged Author to manage comments under another Author's posts. The admin/controller/content/comment.php and admin/controller/content/comments.php controllers and the admin/sql/sqlite/comment.sql queries accept a caller-controlled comment_id without verifying comment.post_id against post.admin_id for the current admin_id. An attacker can read pending comment content and commenter email addresses, change moderation status, edit comment content, or delete comments, breaking author and moderation boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to 1.0.8.4, Vvveb backend product question operations allow a low-privileged Vendor to manage questions under another Vendor's products. The admin/sql/sqlite/product_question.sql queries accept a caller-controlled product_question_id and do not verify product_question.product_id against product.admin_id for the current admin_id. An attacker can read pending question content and moderation data, change question status, edit question content, or delete questions, manipulating product Q&A visibility and integrity. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.8.4. |
| Vvveb before version 1.0.8.2 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the media upload handler that allows authenticated users with media-upload permissions to bypass extension restrictions by uploading a .htaccess file to map .phtml extensions to the PHP handler. Attackers can upload a .phtml file containing arbitrary PHP code and execute the uploaded payload through a subsequent unauthenticated HTTP GET request to the uploaded file, resulting in remote code execution with web server privileges. |
| Vvveb before 1.0.8.3 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the plugin upload endpoint that allows super_admin users to execute arbitrary PHP code by uploading a malicious plugin ZIP file. Attackers can craft a ZIP containing a plugin.php with a valid Slug header and a public/index.php file with arbitrary PHP code, which executes as the web server user once accessed via subsequent unauthenticated HTTP requests to the plugin's public path. |
| Vvveb before version 1.0.8.2 contains an XML external entity (XXE) injection vulnerability in the admin Tools/Import feature that allows authenticated site_admin users to read arbitrary files and modify database records. Attackers can exploit the XML parser configuration in system/import/xml.php to inject file:// or php://filter entity references that are resolved and persisted into the application database, enabling arbitrary file disclosure and administrator password hash overwriting for privilege escalation. |
| Vvveb before 1.0.8.3 contains an uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in the admin controller dispatch cycle where Base::init() repeatedly invokes permission() on error handlers, causing infinite recursion until PHP memory limits are exhausted. Attackers can send sustained requests to forbidden admin URLs from a low-privilege account to exhaust PHP memory on all workers and cause denial of service to legitimate traffic. |
| Vvveb before version 1.0.8.2 contains an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the admin code editor that allows low-privilege authenticated users to execute arbitrary code through insufficient file extension restrictions, with the uploaded payload then executable via subsequent unauthenticated HTTP requests. Attackers with editor, author, contributor, or site_admin roles can write a malicious .htaccess file to map arbitrary extensions to the PHP handler, then upload PHP code with that extension to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution when the file is accessed via HTTP. |
