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Wed, 19 Aug 2026 21:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. | |
| Title | Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-754 | |
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cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-19T21:00:27.627Z
Reserved: 2026-08-17T23:49:03.449Z
Link: CVE-2026-75595
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-19T21:17:37.563
Modified: 2026-08-19T21:17:37.563
Link: CVE-2026-75595
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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