Description
A flaw was found in Netty's `RedisArrayAggregator` component. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted nested Redis (RESP) array headers. This can cause the `RedisArrayAggregator` to eagerly preallocate a large amount of heap memory, leading to heap memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service (DoS) for applications using `RedisDecoder` with `RedisArrayAggregator` on untrusted traffic.
Published: 2026-09-18
Score: 7.5 High
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

See https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-r4xx-7fpg-j8xg for fixed versions and remediation guidance.

Tracking

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Advisories

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History

Sat, 19 Sep 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

 threat_severity

Important

Fri, 18 Sep 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description ## Summary `RedisArrayAggregator` recently added `maxElements` and `maxNestedArrayDepth` limits to fix public Redis resource-exhaustion advisories. The limits are independent, but the allocator remains eager: every positive nested RESP array header creates `new ArrayList<RedisMessage>(length)` before any child element exists. With the default constructor, an attacker can send nested array headers with length `1,000,000` until the default nesting limit of `1024` is reached. This can reserve up to `1,024,000,000` child slots from roughly 12 KB of RESP input. This is backing capacity, not logical list size: `ArrayList(int)` constructs an empty list with the specified initial capacity. ## Technical Details Current `decodeRedisArrayHeader(...)` checks the two limits independently: ```java if (header.length() > maxElements) { throw new CodecException("this codec doesn't support longer length than " + maxElements); } if (depths.size() >= maxNestedArrayDepth) { releaseAndClearDepths(); throw new CodecException("max nested array depth exceeded: " + maxNestedArrayDepth); } depths.push(new AggregateState((int) header.length())); ``` `AggregateState` i A flaw was found in Netty's `RedisArrayAggregator` component. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted nested Redis (RESP) array headers. This can cause the `RedisArrayAggregator` to eagerly preallocate a large amount of heap memory, leading to heap memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service (DoS) for applications using `RedisDecoder` with `RedisArrayAggregator` on untrusted traffic.
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Fri, 18 Sep 2026 13:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Netty: netty-codec-redis: io.netty/netty-codec-redis: netty: redisarrayaggregator nested resp headers multiply patched preallocation limits Io.netty/netty-codec-redis: netty: redisarrayaggregator nested resp headers multiply patched preallocation limits

Fri, 18 Sep 2026 13:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

Fri, 18 Sep 2026 11:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description ## Summary `RedisArrayAggregator` recently added `maxElements` and `maxNestedArrayDepth` limits to fix public Redis resource-exhaustion advisories. The limits are independent, but the allocator remains eager: every positive nested RESP array header creates `new ArrayList<RedisMessage>(length)` before any child element exists. With the default constructor, an attacker can send nested array headers with length `1,000,000` until the default nesting limit of `1024` is reached. This can reserve up to `1,024,000,000` child slots from roughly 12 KB of RESP input. This is backing capacity, not logical list size: `ArrayList(int)` constructs an empty list with the specified initial capacity. ## Technical Details Current `decodeRedisArrayHeader(...)` checks the two limits independently: ```java if (header.length() > maxElements) { throw new CodecException("this codec doesn't support longer length than " + maxElements); } if (depths.size() >= maxNestedArrayDepth) { releaseAndClearDepths(); throw new CodecException("max nested array depth exceeded: " + maxNestedArrayDepth); } depths.push(new AggregateState((int) header.length())); ``` `AggregateState` i
Title Netty: netty-codec-redis: io.netty/netty-codec-redis: netty: redisarrayaggregator nested resp headers multiply patched preallocation limits
First Time appeared Redhat
Redhat camel Spring Boot
Redhat jboss Enterprise Application Platform
Redhat jboss Fuse
Redhat red Hat Single Sign On
Weaknesses CWE-770
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:camel_spring_boot:4
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_enterprise_application_platform:7
cpe:/a:redhat:jboss_fuse:7
cpe:/a:redhat:red_hat_single_sign_on:7
Vendors & Products Redhat
Redhat camel Spring Boot
Redhat jboss Enterprise Application Platform
Redhat jboss Fuse
Redhat red Hat Single Sign On
References

Subscriptions

Redhat Camel Spring Boot Jboss Enterprise Application Platform Jboss Fuse Red Hat Single Sign On
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: redhat

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-18T20:09:44.581Z

Reserved: 2026-09-18T10:29:10.414Z

Link: CVE-2026-93572

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-09-18T14:40:18.566Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-09-18T11:17:21.900

Modified: 2026-09-18T21:18:48.020

Link: CVE-2026-93572

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-09-10T00:52:10Z

Links: CVE-2026-93572 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-09-18T23:30:15Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-770

    Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling