| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework for Node.js. Versions of fastify before 5.12.1 are affected by a schema validation bypass when a request body schema targets a root primitive value. When the schema validates a top-level primitive such as an integer, Ajv can coerce a JSON string into the expected type during validation, but Fastify does not replace the root request body with the coerced value, so the route handler receives the original unvalidated string. As a result, a request that should have failed validation can reach application logic with a value that does not satisfy the schema, which can undermine integrity and access-control checks that rely on the validated type. Users should upgrade to fastify 5.12.1, which fixes the mismatch. No known workarounds are available. |
| fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework for Node.js. Impact: the fix for CVE-2026-3635 added a guard on the forwarded-header reads used to derive the request host, protocol, hostname, ip, and ips values, checking the connecting address. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of trustProxy correctly, because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form, where trustProxy is set to a number, compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address, so the guard is always satisfied for any hop count of one or more. Applications configured with a numeric trustProxy value, such as trustProxy set to 1 for a single reverse proxy, remain vulnerable: an attacker who can reach the Fastify origin directly, bypassing the front-facing proxy, can spoof the forwarded request fields exactly as in the unpatched version. The impact class matches the parent CVE-2026-3635, including host injection in generated URLs, HTTPS-enforcement bypass, secure-cookie and CSRF-origin bypass, and host-based routing and cache poisoning. Affected versions are fastify from 5.8.3 up to but not including 5.12.1. Patches: patched in fastify 5.12.1, where the numeric form of trustProxy is disabled at runtime and removed from the TypeScript type union. Workarounds: migrate to an IP, CIDR, or custom-function trustProxy value that validates the connecting address, and ensure the Fastify origin is only reachable through the trusted proxy chain. |
| @fastify/multipart is a multipart form-data parser for Fastify. In versions from 3.0.0 up to but not including 10.1.1, request.saveRequestFiles() can leave completed temporary files on disk when a client disconnects while the parser is advancing between multipart parts. The iterator rejection that occurs between parts falls outside the per-file cleanup path, so an earlier completed file is never removed. An unauthenticated client can repeat this to cause persistent, linear disk consumption, leading to denial of service. This is an incomplete-fix variant of CVE-2025-24033. The issue is fixed in @fastify/multipart 10.1.1. Users should upgrade to 10.1.1. |
| @fastify/multipart is a multipart form-data parser for Fastify. In versions from 5.3.0 up to but not including 10.1.1, when the busboy fileSize limit truncates a file part, the plugin clears its internal current-file reference while the underlying stream is still open. If the client then aborts the connection before sending the terminating boundary, the abort cleanup finds no stream to destroy, so saveRequestFiles() never settles, the request handler hangs, and the temporary file already written to disk is never cleaned up. An unauthenticated client can repeat this to permanently leak temporary files and suspended handler executions, leading to disk and event-loop exhaustion. The issue is fixed in @fastify/multipart 10.1.1. Users should upgrade to 10.1.1. |
| @fastify/jwt is a JSON Web Token plugin for Fastify. In versions before 10.2.2, a per-request verification key passed to request.jwtVerify({ key }) is silently overridden by the plugin's globally configured secret, because the option merge applies the global key last. Applications that use different keys for different authorization domains, for example separate user and admin keys, therefore accept a token signed with the global key on a route that explicitly requires another key. This lets an ordinary authenticated user cross a key-based trust boundary without knowing either secret. The issue is fixed in @fastify/jwt 10.2.2, where an explicit per-call key takes precedence over the global secret. Users should upgrade to 10.2.2. |
| @fastify/oauth2 is an OAuth 2.0 plugin for Fastify. In versions from 7.2.0 up to but not including 8.3.0, the plugin validates the OAuth state, and with PKCE the code verifier, by comparing the callback query parameter against an unprefixed, predictable cookie, with no server-side binding to the browser that began the flow. Any party able to write a cookie for the application's host, such as a sibling subdomain under the same registrable domain, can plant matching state and verifier cookies and complete an attacker-owned OAuth flow inside a victim's browser, silently signing the victim in to the attacker's account (login CSRF). It does not expose the victim's own account, credentials, or tokens. The issue is fixed in @fastify/oauth2 8.3.0, which adds an opt-in hostPrefixedCookies option. Users should upgrade to 8.3.0 and enable it, or bind state to a server-side session. |
| @fastify/busboy is a multipart form-data parser. In versions 3.1.0 through 3.2.0, a remote unauthenticated attacker can stall the Node.js event loop by sending a multipart request whose boundary is crafted to a specific length. The vendored streaming search stores its skip table in a fixed 256 entry byte array, and a boundary of exactly 252 bytes makes the search needle 256 bytes, which truncates the default skip distance to zero and turns the search into a CPU bound loop on a small body. A single small request can keep one core busy and deny service to other requests handled by the same process. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.1, which widens the skip table so the skip distance is preserved. Users should upgrade to 3.2.1. |
| @fastify/busboy is a multipart form-data parser. In versions 1.0.0 through 3.2.0, an attacker who can submit multipart form-data can crash the parser by sending a part header whose name is a prototype-inherited property such as __proto__ or constructor. The internal header parser stores headers in a plain JavaScript object and assumes each value is an array, so an inherited property name resolves to a truthy non-array value and triggers a TypeError. In the common pipe integration the failure surfaces as an error event, but in direct write or end usage the exception is thrown synchronously and can terminate the Node.js process, causing an unauthenticated denial of service. The issue is fixed in @fastify/busboy 3.2.1, which creates the header object with a null prototype. Users should upgrade to 3.2.1. |
| @fastify/static before version 10.1.3 contains an incomplete fix for a previous route guard bypass. The static file handler rejected only parent directory segments, but it did not canonicalize dot segments, duplicate slashes, encoded dots, or backslashes before route matching and before delegating to the send layer. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker could request a file protected by a route based guard using a non canonical path form that misses the guarded route yet resolves back onto the protected file, disclosing its contents. Applications that protect a subtree of the static root with a route based guard are affected, while applications relying on the allowedPath option are not. This is fixed in @fastify/static 10.1.3, which canonicalizes the pathname, including rejecting backslashes, on the path used for routing and serving. |
| @fastify/aws-lambda version 6.4.0 decorates each Fastify request with request.awsLambda.event and request.awsLambda.context, values that applications are documented to use for authorization decisions such as reading API Gateway authorizer claims. In the default configuration, the getter that populates this decoration reads the client-controlled x-apigateway-event and x-apigateway-context HTTP headers before falling back to the trusted internal request token, and those reserved headers are not stripped from the incoming event. An unauthenticated attacker who can set a single HTTP header can therefore forge the entire Lambda proxy event, including the authorizer context, and override the genuine one. This results in a full authentication and authorization bypass and privilege escalation for any application that trusts request.awsLambda.event for identity or access control. Only version 6.4.0 is affected. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/aws-lambda 6.4.1, which resolves the decoration only through the internal per-invocation token and strips the reserved headers before the request is processed. |
| @fastify/forwarded resolves client addresses from the X-Forwarded-For header. In versions before 3.0.2, when the header contains two or more comma separated entries, the parser trims only space characters and does not strip horizontal tabs, even though RFC 7230 defines optional whitespace as both space and tab. As a result, an entry padded with a tab keeps the literal tab in the resolved address string. Applications that make exact string match security decisions on the resolved client IP, such as an allowlist, a blocklist, a per IP rate limit key, or audit log correlation, can be evaded because the tab corrupted string no longer matches the expected value. This does not cross the trust boundary, since a tab corrupted string is not a valid IP and cannot be mistaken for a trusted proxy. The issue is fixed in @fastify/forwarded 3.0.2. |
| @fastify/rate-limit before 11.2.0 keys rate-limit buckets by the verbatim client IP string returned from request.ip. Because a single IPv6 client can control a large address range (a /64 holds 2^64 distinct addresses) and the same address has multiple valid textual representations, an IPv6 capable client can defeat the rate-limit boundary by rotating addresses or by rewriting the same address in different forms. Applications that use @fastify/rate-limit to protect endpoints such as authentication, password reset, OTP delivery, or expensive API calls can be bypassed by IPv6 clients behind a proxy that surfaces IPv6 to the origin when trustProxy is enabled. The issue is fixed in @fastify/rate-limit 11.2.0, where the default key generator normalizes IPv6 addresses to their canonical form, collapses IPv4 mapped IPv6 to IPv4, and applies a configurable prefix mask (default /64) via a new ipv6Subnet option. |
| @fastify/middie versions 9.1.0 through 9.3.2 decode the encoded slash %2F inside path parameter values before matching middleware paths, while Fastify's underlying router preserves the encoding during route lookup. The two layers disagree on the canonical request path, so the middleware fails to match a URL that the route handler does match. When middleware is used for authentication, authorization, rate limiting, or auditing on parameterized paths, an attacker can reach the protected handler by sending a single crafted URL with an encoded slash in the parameter position. The bypass is HTTP method agnostic and requires no authentication or special preconditions. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.3. Workarounds: avoid parameterized middleware paths for security decisions, or enforce authentication at the route handler or via a Fastify hook that runs after the router has resolved the request. |
| @fastify/middie versions 9.1.0 through 9.3.2 fail to guard the URL normalization step used by the standalone engine when incoming request paths contain malformed percent-encoded sequences. Inputs such as an incomplete percent escape or a truncated multibyte sequence cause the underlying decoder to throw synchronously, and the exception escapes the middie normalize step and terminates the Node.js process. The bypass affects applications that call middie.run directly on the standalone engine API, causing an immediate denial of service for all connected clients until restart. Applications using the Fastify plugin path are not affected because Fastifys error handler catches the exception. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/middie 9.3.3. Workarounds: migrate from the standalone engine API to the Fastify plugin path, where the framework error handler catches the exception. |
| Impact: @fastify/reply-from versions from 8.3.1 up to but not including 12.6.4 build the internal URL cache key by concatenating the destination and source path without a delimiter. Different destination and source pairs can therefore produce the same key while resolving to different upstream URLs. When getUpstream selects an upstream from request data, a URL cached for one upstream can be reused for a request intended for another upstream, causing cross-upstream data access and modification. The default configuration is affected. Setting disableCache to true prevents the behavior. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/reply-from 12.6.4. Workarounds: pass disableCache: true when registering the plugin. |
| Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions from 9.4.0 up to and including 11.5.0 fail to validate the resolved WebSocket destination path against the configured rewrite prefix. The WebSocket routing path in WebSocketProxy.findUpstream resolves the destination via the WHATWG URL constructor, which collapses dot segments, so a crafted upgrade request with path traversal sequences can escape the rewrite prefix and reach upstream endpoints that were not meant to be exposed by the proxy. This is a variant of CVE-2021-21322 in a code path that never went through the HTTP fix in fastify/reply-from. Exploitation requires a non-normalizing WebSocket client, since browsers and the ws package normalize the request path before sending, but raw HTTP clients or downstream proxies that forward the request target unchanged make the attack reachable in production topologies.
Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0.
Workarounds: none. |
| Impact: @fastify/http-proxy versions up to and including 11.5.0 fail to rewrite the request prefix when the prefix segment is URL-encoded. Fastify's router URL-decodes paths for route matching, but request.url retains the original encoded form, and the prefix-rewrite step uses a literal string replace against the decoded prefix. A request that encodes one or more characters of the configured prefix therefore matches the route but skips the rewrite, so the raw encoded path is forwarded to the upstream unchanged. The upstream then decodes the path and serves it, letting an attacker reach upstream paths that the proxy was configured to hide via rewritePrefix, including internal or administrative endpoints.
Patches: upgrade to @fastify/http-proxy 11.6.0.
Workarounds: none. |
| @fastify/static evaluates the allowedPath callback before normalizing dot segments and duplicate path separators in the pathname used for file resolution. Versions up to and including 10.1.1 are affected. An unauthenticated attacker can bypass allowedPath restrictions by requesting equivalent non-canonical pathnames, causing files that were intended to be denied to be served anyway. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats path-based filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.2. |
| @fastify/static up to and including version 10.1.0 fails to reject dot-dot path segments in request pathnames before the file-resolution stage. This is a bypass of the earlier fix for CVE-2026-6414, which only covered encoded forward slashes. Because the underlying send library normalizes dot segments before applying its own path-traversal guard, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass any route-scoped middleware and read files inside the static root that live under the guarded URL prefix. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats route-guard filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.1. |
| @fastify/express versions 4.0.6 and earlier only rewrite the plugin prefix for middleware mount paths when the path argument is a string. Non-string mount paths (arrays of paths and regular expressions) are left unprefixed inside prefixed plugin scopes, so middleware registered with those forms does not match the actual prefixed request path. Applications that use path-scoped middleware for authentication, authorization, rate limiting, or auditing on routes inside a prefixed scope can be bypassed by sending a request to the prefixed route, because Fastify still matches the route but the middleware is skipped. Patches: upgrade to @fastify/express 4.0.7. Workarounds: use string mount paths instead of arrays or regular expressions in prefixed plugins, or register one use call per path. |
